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Journal of Administration Overseas

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INCLUDING

Adult Education for Development
by E. G. Wedell

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by Harold A. Lutchman

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by Apolo Nsibambi

Colonial Government and Populist Reform: the Case of the Ivory Coast — Part II
Local Administration at Independence and After
by Martin Staniland

BOOK REVIEWS
by Guy Hunter, Richard Symonds, Professor D. J. Murray, R. S. McDougal, Professor R. V. Parker, P. S. Tregear and W. Wood.

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Editor's Notes

LAST September the eighth Cambridge Conference on development discussed "Prospects for Employment Opportunities in the Nineteen Seventies" and we include in our Quarterly Notes the personal impressions of three of the overseas participants. Both Dr. Kavoussi and Mr. Nyamu criticize the way in which economists tended to dominate the Conference and more than one British social scientist has voiced the same complaint. On the other hand nearly half of the economists present came from less developed countries and, in all, economists numbered a third of the conference membership – they formed, of course, no united front against administrators and others, but as in previous conferences they were less hesitant than some non-economists in seeking to catch the Chairman's eye.

The subject of the Conference proved far more difficult to develop than many had expected. Unfortunately Mr. David Morse did not stay to enlarge upon the "dethronement of GNP" theme of his keynote opening paper, and the task of conference members was not eased by the reluctance on the part of distinguished Indian members to admit of any serious unemployment problem in their subcontinent. Then again some economists were unwilling to admit that their methods had ever erred during the first development decade – inferring that political decision-making was to blame for failures that could now be rectified by the allocation of more resources to the traditional (basically rural) instead of the modern (basically industrial) sector. Nonetheless new ideas did emerge – from David Morse, from Dudley Seers' exposition of the ILO Mission to Colombia, and others. The most hopeful message that participants took home must have been that the emphasis of the Seventies should be upon human betterment, that social development could not be measured solely in terms of economic growth but had to be measured by the extent to which all sections of the community could achieve adequate living standards.

The Conference Report will be published in a few months time by H.M. Stationery Office and will include a forthright review of the proceedings by John White besides personal impressions by Professor G. M. Meier, Dr. John Lonsdale, E. M. Godfrey and Philip O'Brien, and a complete set of the background papers. Dr. Ronald Robinson moves to Oxford later this year as Beit Professor of Commonwealth History and so relinquishes the Chairmanship which he has discharged (since the inception of this conference series) with notable élan and success.

One much discussed topic at the conference, the problem of youth unemployment, is discussed by Professor Wedell in his thoughtful article on Adult Education, in which he draws particular attention to the alarming proportion of higher educated youth that fails to find employment in many countries. He emphasises the need to rethink the whole structure of the educational system and to orientate it to local needs and not to Western concepts. He also indicates a special role, with a moral and ethical commitment, for adult education. In Professor Wedell's words "it is only if matters of motivation among large sections of the adult population are handled within the constraints of an educational rather than a propaganda situation that . . . a government has a chance of securing the long-term support which its development policies require" – e.g. a readiness to tighten the belt where necessary in the public interest.

Dr. Lutchman examines the problems facing Guyana in establishing a "Co-operative Republic" as the means of hastening economic and social development. Three sectors are planned for the economy, public private and co-operative – with the latter as the means of raising the living standards of the "small man". The author sees weaknesses in the administrative machinery's capacity to sustain the co-operative structure as the major difficulty to be overcome by the Guyana Government.

In the second part of his article on the Ivory Coast Mr. Staniland carries forward his study of local administration in a franco-phone country from the pre- to the post- independence era. He sees the present Ivory Coast administrators as capable of ensuring adequate control of government machinery but he doubts whether the inherited administrative structure coupled with the inherited belief that the introduction of the metropolitan prefectorial system in itself created modernity, will make the Ivoirien generalist administrator, now enjoying a renewed lease of life, an effective agent for generating change – which should be one of his prime tasks.

Time and again at the Cambridge Conference the need to reallocate resources so that more people can see the reality of development, was emphasised. One way to do this at local level has been undertaken in Uganda. Mr. Nsibambi explains how, since 1966, the policy of the Uganda Government has been to redress the economic imbalance of the country by imposing strict control of available finance and directing a greater share than hitherto to the least developed districts; richer districts of the former Kingdom of Buganda are expected to utilise their own potential means for development.

Finally Mr. Griffiths provides an historical outline of the development of local government in Botswana where the position of the Chiefs was for so long a very strong one and progress towards a democratic system of local administration very gradual.

Adult Education and Development

By E. G. WEDELL

Mr. Wedell is Professor of Adult Education and Director of Extra-Mural Studies at the Victoria University of Manchester.

Introduction

Both adult education and development are large concepts. We are now a good deal less confident than perhaps once we were in defining either of them. But we must try to identify what we are talking about. Adult Education is the easier of the two, so let me begin there.

Adult Education

From a historical background, particularly in the English tradition which infused into adult education a strong dose of missionary fervour the concept has in recent years emerged into a more functional role within the educational spectrum. In the course of this it has lost some of its sense of mission while gaining in professional and intellectual rigour. I think it would be a pity if these two types of quality were to become mutually exclusive.

We are now inclined more than in the past to regard adult education as being the *whole* of that branch of the educational discipline concerned with the provision of educational facilities for adults, irrespective of its vocational or non-vocational orientation. We have developed a more task-oriented approach, recognising that adult learning is one and inadvisible whether it is concerned to impart literacy to a tribesman in Ethiopia or helping a manager in New York to learn about discounted cash flow. We recognise the differences in content and method, but regard them as points on the same continuum of adult education.

Similarly we think of the concept of education throughout the life span as a concept which distinguishes educational theory and practice in the second half of this century sharply from previous views of the educational process. We no longer regard education as the means of inducting a new generation into the thought-forms and *mores* of their predecessors, an induction which proceeds at some time during the age-span between 5 and 15 or 20 years and which culminates in some rite of passage after which the pupil is "finished". We no longer expect to be able to regard the achievement of this single educational peak as providing sufficient gravity to enable the product to coast gently downhill for the remainder of his life. We think it is more appropriate to relate his educational experience, and the input of educational resources, more closely to his needs and interests at different stages of his life. New peaks have to be scaled throughout the life span.

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* This paper was read at the Caribbean Conference on Adult Education, in April 1970.

These developments have brought about a change in public attitudes to adult education in the last ten years or so. In the United Kingdom this has been marked by the re-invigoration of much old-style adult education by the use of adult learning techniques in the in-service training of many trades and professions, by the recognition on the part of many agencies concerned with attitude change among adults of their roots in the "great tradition" of adult education, and by an upsurge in demand for professional training, development and research in this field.

My impression is that this change is going on all over the world. From my chair in Manchester and during my travels I have been interested to observe related activities in all five continents. And the Caribbean conference is another example of the growing identification of this sector of education by governments and voluntary bodies of all kinds.

The important role of voluntary bodies is one facet which distinguishes adult education from other educational activities. It has important structural and methodological consequences. I shall return to this aspect later.

Development

It is comparatively easy to say something to identify what I mean by adult education. It is a good deal more difficult and hazardous to try to define what I mean by development. This is very much an "in" word at present. I have so far always resisted its use on its own, believing that it is meaningful only in relation to some thing, situation or activity which is, has been, or is in process of being, developed. Thus I don't mind talking about educational, social or economic development. But to speak of development on its own comes hard. I fear, however, that I am fighting a losing battle. If proof were needed that development as a concept has taken on an autonomous meaning, the recent report to the World Bank by the group of wise men under Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada would provide it. The report, as you know, is entitled *Partners in Development* and the body which produced it was called "The Commission on International Development".[1]

I am therefore content to be defeated by the dynamics of language which is always creating new words to describe new situations or re-shaping the use of old words to serve new purposes. Development, as used by the Pearson Commission and, as I take it, as intended in the title which was given me for this paper, means the cultural, social and economic development of countries whose condition of life has been virtually static, at a low socio-economic level, for long periods of history so as to enable them to live and move as viable partners in the modern world of nations.

Having accepted the use of the term, I have to enter a reservation. Development *from* a particular baseline I can accept; but development towards *what*? The so-called developed nations of North America and Western Europe have tended to assume that any development must be towards *their* cultural, social and economic way of life. A great deal that passes under the name of development today is so oriented. This has always seemed to me both presumptuous and foolish on the part of the developed nations. I think I said so when I was last in the Caribbean three years ago. I repeat it with greater conviction now. Developments in Europe and North America in these last few years have begun to show that the strides which were made in these countries in the last hundred years of exceptional economic growth were achieved at a high cost in human maladjustment and suffering. It would be ironic if the unheeding quest for material prosperity, of which many developed countries are now reaping the whirlwind, were to be emulated by the developing countries, only to expose them to comparable, and possibly worse, suffering in the years to come.

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[1] L. B. Pearson, *Partners in Development* (Pall Mall Press).

Thus I go with Hans Singer when he maintains that a development plan must start from resources rather from targets.[2] It must take the situation as it *is* not as, in terms of an inappropriate model, it might be. We must learn the lesson of history that, as Guy Hunter says, "growth takes place as a long chain of small, related sequences, each of which determines the possibilities of the next. Like floodwater spreading on uneven ground, the runnels of change divide and coalesce again, here are diverted by a hillock, there are checked in a depression, build up and break out again in new directions. The history of man in society can give some helpful indications of its general course; its detail is a matter of exact and patiently accumulated knowledge of the social topography of each special case." [3]

Having identified where I stand in regard to the two key concepts of this contribution, I now intend to consider briefly the characteristics of the current situation in the field of education in the developing world; to look at the base line from which development proceeds; and to try to identify the role which adult education may play in the process of development.

The educational situation

As many well know, the two obstacles to a clear understanding of the progress of development in education are the difficulty of obtaining reliable and up-to-date statistics and of establishing internationally comparable criteria of measurement. I have, for instance, found it impossible to obtain statistics for the Caribbean Region as a whole; in most of the literature this appears to be grouped with Latin America. Hence my figures, and the deductions from them, are bound to be generalisations.

There is no doubt that, quantitatively, the educational situation of the developing world has improved a good deal in the last fifteen years or so. The Pearson Report boasts that "free and universal education has, in principle, been accepted as a human right." It records that "The initial reluctance of parents in rural communities to forego the earnings of child labour yielded to the social prestige and economic value of education." Between 1950 and 1965 enrolment in schools tripled. The enrolments in the three stages of education advanced as follows:

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[2] H. W. Singer, *International Development: Growth and Change.*

[3] G. Hunter, *Modernising Peasant Societies* (O.U.P. 1969), p. 293.

	1950	1965
Primary	57 m	137 m
Secondary	1.5 m	5.8 m
Higher	1.0 m	3.5 m

The share of education in national budgets also grew and in 1965 stood, on average, at 16 per cent. More than ten countries devoted some 25 per cent of their budgets to education. The annual growth rate for educational expenditure during the 15 years in question was:

Asia	13%
Africa	16%
Latin America	20%

When private and local government expenditure was added to central government expenditure the average total proportion of national income devoted to education was around 5%.[4]

But, of course, these figures hide as much as they reveal. The range of situations covered by these global rates is almost infinite. Let me illustrate by reference to some more recent figures for Tanzania. They relate to 1969, i.e. four years after the end of the period to which the Pearson figures relate. To that extent they should represent an improvement.

Age Group 12–17
in Tanzania, 1969

no schooling	700,000
up to 4 years school	480,000
up to 7 years school	295,000
secondary school	25,000
	1,500,000

And this is a good deal better than in some parts of Africa. Recent UNESCO figures estimated that out of 5,350,000 children of school age in Africa 3,816,000 (72 per cent) will be classified as adult illiterates when they reach the age of 15).[5]

A further and most important obstacle to a fair assessment of the position is that the published statistics do not include *formal and informal adult education or literacy activities*. Under the UNDP projects which are currently experimenting with adult functional and selective literacy campaigns in a number of countries we are for the first time obtaining *some* comparable figures in this field. Since the projects are highly selective, however, they are of no significance in this global context.

Nor are there any reliable statistics relating to the *educational role of the mass media*. The Masai tribesman with a spear in one hand and a transistor radio in the other is by now an archetypal figure and it may well be that the aural and visual media will outflank literacy in the race to bring backward populations into the 20th century. Somehow or other this effort needs to be harnessed to the sum total of educational development.

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[4] Source: Hunter, *op. cit.* p. 225.
[5] *Basic Facts and Figures* (UNESCO 1958).

But let me for a moment revert to the *formal educational structures*, and discuss two aspects of these which raise serious doubts about the wisdom of educational opportunities of the conventional type.

The first is the relationship of opportunities for schooling to the availability of employment. Many readers will be familiar with the impact of the unemployment of school leavers. According to ILO figures, in Jamaica recently 39 per cent of the unemployed were found to be in the 15–19 age group; of the 121,000 people in this age group, 43 per cent were out of work. In Guyana, according to the same figures, 44 per cent of the urban unemployed were recorded as being in the 14–18 age group. In Ceylon out of 475,000 unemployed 374,000 were between 14 and 25 years. In Malaysia unemployment in the 15–19 age group reached 30 per cent.[6] Thus in many countries the case for expanding primary education is no longer self-evident; what is the use of providing more places if there are no jobs for the pupils? But political pressures may well go the other way.

The expansion of secondary and higher education poses similar problems. In Asia, more than in Africa or the Caribbean, the growth of higher education has moved entirely out of relationship to the needs of the countries concerned. And the overproduction of graduates, which has been familiar in arts subjects and the law, now also applies to engineers. There are many thousands of unemployed engineers in South India and the Philippines at present.

Nor is it any longer tenable that education necessarily makes for economic growth. There seems to be a correlation between high population density and unemployment among the educated sector of the population. The state of Kerala in South India is an example. It has an income per head which is 15 per cent less than the Indian average even though 47 per cent of the population are literate compared with 25 per cent in India as a whole.

The second aspect of the present educational situation which should cause us to rethink carefully our educational policies is the unfitness of many primary school leavers for such employment as there is. Since the objective of most primary education has traditionally been to pass on its most able pupils to the secondary school, its syllabus has tended to be dominated by the academic demands of the latter. The proportion of primary school pupils who in practice make this move is in many countries small.

Thus it seems essential to liberate primary education from the domination of the academically oriented secondary school. Many of its pupils will have to take on a variety of jobs on the land as well as in the urban areas, or will return to their homesteads as their only place of work. V. L. Griffiths has suggested that for this reason the schools should concentrate first on attitudes; "an enquiring mind, willing to question a tradition or superstition; a mind willing to plan ahead, rather than passively accept fate . . . care and accuracy in measuring and calculating – one day this will be a vital quality in using fertiliser, insecticide, in grading for the market, in farm accounts; a readiness to work hard and beyond set hours; a readiness to co-operate in new institutions; a recognition that change is continuous. Second there are the usual skills of reading, writing and calculation, plus handiness in odd jobs at home or on the farm. Third, in terms of knowledge, some appreciation of very simple economics, values and prices, and an elementary insight into scientific method."[7] I quote this syllabus outline because, although it is ambitious, it does point in the right direction. Anyone mastering the skills here quoted would be the kind of entrepreneur who would know how to make a living in almost any situation.

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[6] Paper MCYW/1967/2 (ILO, Geneva 1967) quoted in Rural Development (London, O.D.M. 1969), pp. 2 and 3.

These are only two respects of many in which the export of European models has made it more difficult for the developing world to identify its own needs and to work out its own means of meeting them. In the immediate post independence phase, when the political identity of many countries had to be established and it was thought that the removal of the colonial yoke would bring with it the solution of a country's social and economic problems, it was often difficult to accept that European models might not provide the answer. My impression is that this has now become a more acceptable view and that the time is ripe for a reassessment of educational needs and possibilities in the light of the developmental situation as it is, not as we might wish it to be. I want therefore now to turn to a brief look at this.

The developmental situation

The purpose of thinking about adult education and development is to discover the ways in which adult education can best contribute towards development. We must therefore understand the condition of the countries with which we are concerned. What are these?

I suppose the safest generalisation one can make about developing countries at the moment is that most of them will have a predominantly rural economy for many years to come. It is true that in a number of countries the industrial sector is expanding faster than the agricultural, and the number of countries where this will be so will increase. But in absolute terms the industrial sector will remain small. Nor is it wise to pin our hopes too greatly on a massive expansion of employment opportunities as a result of such industrialisation as there may be. If it is to be competitive, industry has to be productive, no less productive than competing industries in other countries. And productivity all too often means a high ratio of capital to labour. There are some industries which can be competitive on the basis of labour-intensive techniques. But there will be few jobs for the unskilled.

Accordingly the future for the large majority of citizens of developing countries lies in a better life on the land. Such a better life can come about only if we manage to break the vicious circle of a low rural living standard which causes a drift of the able young people into the towns. This drift reduces the proportion of people with talent and enterprise in the rural areas and thus helps to perpetuate low living standards there.

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[7] Quoted in Hunter, *op. cit.* pp. 253-4.

But of course living standards in rural areas depend not only on an increase in production, but also of consumption. Unless agricultural surpluses can be sold, they are worthless. And the sale of such surpluses depends on the existence of overseas and domestic markets. Domestic markets are found in urban areas. Thus the emergence of urban areas with a wage-earning population which can pay cash for goods and services is an important ingredient in development.

The keeping in balance of urban growth and rural development should therefore in my view be the primary objective of any developing economy. How is this achieved?

How do we make life in the rural areas sufficiently attractive to retain at least some of the most able people of each generation? There is no universally valid prescription. But it stands to reason that people in the rural areas want at least the same basic facilities as in the towns; adequate water supply; electricity and power; some drainage and sewage disposal; reasonable roads; access to health and educational services; access to credit facilities and markets.

This is a substantial list: I should be interested to know how far it is regarded as right, and in which order of priority others would place the items.

But none of these objectives can be achieved, unless there are both public and private surplus resources which can be applied to them. The creation and accumulation over a period of such surpluses must therefore be the major preoccupation of national planners. The question is, how much development can be achieved by the mobilization of unused internal resources and how much only by a system of exchange with the developed world? Until recently the latter has been regarded as the line of advance likely to yield the quickest and largest return. It is, of course, the system by which Western industrial countries operate, whose economic survival depends on the ability to finance large volumes of imports. It has tended to be assumed – too blindly in my view – that this is the pattern most likely to lead developing countries to prosperity. The doctrine that these countries should at all costs increase their foreign earnings by selling manufacturers to developed countries has been preached at the UNCTAD meetings and in other development meetings.

It has become apparent only recently that the debts which developing countries have to incur in order to acquire the manufacturing capacity to enable them to export tend to cancel out many of the advantages which flow from international trade. For this reason there is a tendency to return to the exploitation of internal resources, not as the only form of development but as a form which should be pursued on equal terms. Of course the development of internal resources also involves problems. It is bound to mean fairly massive credit creation; and this in turn means devaluing an overvalued currency, which makes import too easy, export too hard, and encourages capital intensive methods at precisely the wrong moment.

Having created surpluses, they have to be accumulated and invested rather than consumed. This problem is a good deal more difficult now than it was for a developing country like the United Kingdom in the 19th century.

Then it was possible for British entrepreneurs to withhold from the workers who helped to produce the surpluses all but a small share of these. Workers were ignorant, ill-organized and means of communication were poor. The workers therefore knew little about the economic return on their labour: they had little opportunity of finding out how their fellows in the same industry elsewhere were facing, and even where they knew about these things the unfavourable (to the workers) relationship between the demand for, and the supply of, labour, meant that they could not afford to assert themselves. It was therefore possible for a large part of the accumulated surpluses to be invested in capital goods calculated to increase productivity.

Today the accumulation of surpluses over a period is much more difficult. It depends on the exercise, by the producers of those surpluses, of wage restraint, and of a willingness to save rather than to consume. In a society where political power is much more widely shared it is a good deal more difficult to withhold surpluses from those who help to produce them unless they consent. And such consent requires an element of economic sophistication which is largely lacking in the electorates of developing countries. It also required an element of national, rather than individual, objectives. Particularly in a mixed economy the encouragement to spend is an essential part of the operation of the market, which may militate against the virtue of thrift. Again, the mass media, often unwittingly, display standards of affluence which people want to emulate: and who can blame them?

The role of adult education

This brings me to my last group of observations: the part which adult education can play in development.

The socio-psychological problems of creating and maintaining a sense of common purpose among a community, of strengthening its will to develop and to defer gratifications even if these are justified, is one which can be tackled in one of two ways. It can either be the subject of substantial propaganda and of pressures which do violence to the dignity of the human person. Or it can be the subject of intensive and participative community education. In the latter case the role of adult education is crucial. I mentioned at the beginning of this paper the evacuation of adult education of some of its moral content in the course of developing a progressively functional approach. I now return to this theme and emphasise the importance of the moral and ethical commitment of adult education. It is only if matters of motivation among large sections of the adult population are handled within the constraints of an educational, rather than a propaganda situation that real understanding will develop and that a government has a chance of securing the long-term support which its development policies require.

There is, then, a substantial role for adult education to play in enabling the population to understand what is happening to it and of helping it to remain in control of development rather than being controlled by it.

Next, let me return to the contribution which adult education can make to the basic educational system of a country. Quite apart from the inherent arguments for what UNESCO circles describe as *education permanente*, economic considerations should today cause all educational planners and policy makers to consider a redistribution of investment in education. It has become clear that much education at the primary and secondary stages is wasted. Children do not have the experience against the background of which effective learning takes place. Nor do they have the same motivation to learn as an adult in undertaking a particular block of learning which is closely related to his job or to the business of securing his living. In such a situation learning becomes existentially relevant; it is immediately reinforced by practice and in this way is retained to an extent not otherwise possible.

Task-related learning also means that the educational in-put is placed at the point where the highest rate of return is likely to be secured. One is no longer casting bread upon the waters, not knowing who would pick it up. The element of running to waste is minimised.

Such task-related education can, in many instances, be carried on alongside the exercise of a job and the earning of a living, thus reducing the unit cost per student. I recognize that the admission of this kind of argument is one which educators find it hard to countenance. We have, certainly in Britain, a curiously dualist approach to the relation between education and life. This derives from the schizophrenic theology of our Victorian ancestors, who found it easier to serve God on Sunday and Mammon on the other days of the week than to relate these two sides of human existence. Although they used education effectively for economic development, they liked to think of it as something which was divorced from the business of earning a living. Again, we have left a legacy which it will take some time to overcome. I hope, however, that developing countries will do so and will teach us how education can become a means of unifying the material and spiritual experience of living.

If this can be done, it will make possible the reallocation of scarce educational resources in such a way as to be most useful. The precise arrangements will vary from one situation to another. It may well mean some cutting back on primary and secondary education, or some adjustment of the ages at which education is provided. It would certainly mean some shift of the emphasis in primary education along the lines advocated by Mr. Griffiths. It will mean that secondary education is geared more closely to the kinds of knowledge which a country needs and that higher education is so structured that it does not produce a population of unemployable graduates. In-service courses, with a mixture of part-time study, correspondence study and block release will keep the intellectual activity of adults closely geared to its application. Access to higher education will be across a more flexible threshold than the present O or A level qualifications. And more account will be taken of the experience and motivation of post-experience entrants.

In most developing countries the teaching of adult literacy constitutes an important part of adult education. It is usually thought to be an essential contributor to a policy of national development by "(1) raising the productivity of new literates; (2) raising the productivity of individuals working in association with literates – the so-called spillover effects of literacy; (3) expediting the flow of general knowledge of individuals (say, instructions about the health and nutrition) and thus reducing the cost of transmitting useful information; (4) stimulating the demand for vocational training and technical education; (5) acting as a device for selecting the more able and enhancing their occupational mobility; and finally, and perhaps most important (6) strengthening economic incentives, meaning the tendency for people to respond positively to a rise in the rate of reward for their efforts.[8] Until recently it was thought self-evident that some degree of correlation should exist between literacy rates and economic development. After a review of the historical evidence for the major developed countries like Britain, the U.S.A., France and Russia, C. Arnold Anderson comes to the conclusion that a 40 per cent literacy rate may well be the threshold level for economic development. No major industrial power appears so far to have achieved steady economic growth with a lower literacy rate.[9]

But these comparisons with countries whose industrialisation took place before the age of mass communications may be misleading. Without delving at this point into a discussion of communication theory, it seems worth suggesting that radio and television provide a new visual and oral tradition which makes literacy a good deal less crucial than we once thought it was. There is also the importance of numeracy to which Griffiths refers: a field in which much remains to be done in the developing countries also.

Conclusion

I have touched briefly on three particular areas in which adult education appears to me to have contribution to make to development. So vital is this role that we as adult educators have a duty to move away from the side-lines and into the centre of the educational arena. If we are to do so we must be sure of our ground and of our professional competence.

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[8] M. Blaug, *Literacy and Economic Development* in "The School Review," Winter 1966, pp. 393-4.

[9] C. A. Anderson, *Literacy and Schooling on the Development Threshold* in "Education and Economic Development" (eds. Anderson and Bowman), Chicago, Aldine Publishing Co. 1965, pp. 347-62.

Some Administrative Problems of the Co-operative Republic in Guyana

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Like so many other developing countries, Guyana is concerned with the achievement of rapid social and economic change and development. It has been found that the mere achievement of independence[1] has by no means resulted in solutions to some of the problems which previously existed. There is an awareness that, given the nature of the economy, Guyanese can do little to control their economic fortunes, since their prosperity depends primarily on two products – sugar and bauxite[2] – which are tied to overseas markets. This makes the economy particularly sensitive to fluctuations but, at the same time, the achievement of independence and an increase in nationalism have resulted in a serious questioning of this state of affairs, and Guyanese want not only to be politically independent, but also to be economically independent. In any case, it is appreciated only too well that the one may affect the other, i.e. the extent to which a country may be politically independent may depend on the degree of economic independence or control which it has over its economy. As the Prime Minister is reported on this point, "You say you are independent but in fact you are economically dependent at an international level, and nationally the people who have the political power do not have the economic power."[3]

Independence too, as is so often the case, brought its train of problems which were previously non-existent. Further, unlike the colonial era when government was primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order, the new situation requires that government provides and performs a wide range of social and economic services and functions. The rising expectations of the masses make it desirable that government increases its scale of operation with a view to meeting these demands.

It is in the context of the above that the ruling People's National Congress (P.N.C.) has initiated a move to establish a Co-operative Republic in Guyana. In the words of the Prime Minister, "Our republic will be a Co-operative Republic because we propose to place great emphasis on the co-operative."[4] Guyana became a Republic in February, 1970, but the Co-operative aspect remains to be achieved in the future. However, there is a great deal of information on government's thinking in the matter. The idea is for there to be three sectors in the economy – private, public and co-operative. Co-operatives are to participate in all aspects of the economy and no industry, including sugar, bauxite and timber, is to be sacrosanct.[5] The co-operative sector is to be manned by the small man whose resources would be mobilized, and attempts made to give him an important say in the country's economy – "a say which must be commensurate with his political say which also must be proportionate with his position . . . "[6]

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[1] The former British Guiana became the independent state of Guyana in May, 1966.

[2] It has been estimated that sugar and bauxite account for 80 per cent of the country's domestic product – see, for example, "*Put the Co-operators in the Cabinet*" by *Dr. F. W. Ramsahoye* – "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 8th February, 1970.

[3] Leading article of the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 9th February, 1970.

[4] Report in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 16th February, 1970.

As one authority envisages future developments in Guyana, the Co-operative Republic will be a sort of half-way house between capitalism and communism. The co-operatives will be big business – owning agricultural estates, logging companies and even oil refineries, but this will not be rapacious capitalism. "The smallest man will have as big a say as the biggest shareholder and the profits will not go into the pockets of the few but to every man who . . . had the guts to stake his blood, sweat and a few dollars in the scheme."[7]

Government intends to help co-operatives and give them preference in many respects for, in the words of the Prime Minister, "if co-operatives are to develop, they have to get assistance from Government and they have to get preference."[8] This is justified on the grounds that in running a country preference and assistance have to be given to the weaker sections of the community.[9] Co-operatives are to attain the level where they would be able to compete with private enterprise, but at the same time the plan is to have an amicable co-existence between the groups.[10]

The Problems

It is generally agreed that the objectives outlined by the government are laudible, but there is disagreement as to whether they are attainable. At the very least, most persons agree, including members of the government, that they are not easy to achieve. As the *Evening Post* pointed out, when the Prime Minister affirmed his faith in the co-operative way of life as the solution to Guyana's economic problems, he made no attempt to delude himself that the struggle to establish it "would be long and hard and that deliberate obstacles would be thrown in the way of the co-operatives by those who see the movement as a threat to their position."[11] However, as important as these difficulties are, the ones also frequently stressed as likely constraints are somewhat administrative in nature. According to the Prime Minister, it is proposed that government helps co-operatives by giving training to their leaders and assist them to dispose of what they produce at the best prices. Government also proposes by example, and precept, to help co-operatives to exercise the "best managerial skills."[12] The contention is that the existing machinery of government is by no means adequate to perform these and similar functions, especially in view of past experiences with co-operatives. As one authority has argued, although in Guyana there is a unique record in building schools, roads, hospitals, etc., by self-help, the record in credit unions, co-operative shops and even land settlement schemes is far from outstanding.[13] According to Dr. F. W. Ramsahoye, former Attorney-General in the P.P.P. Government, the contribution to the country's domestic product made by co-operatives which started in Guyana in 1945 under official sponsorship, has so far been negligible and their record as a whole to 1970 has been one of abysmal failure.[14]

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[5] Report of a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 26th October, 1969.

[6] The Prime Minister in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 20th October, 1969.

[7] Carl Blackman in the "*Sunday Graphic*" – 18th October, 1969.

[8] "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 26th October, 1969.

[9] *Ibid.*

[10] "*Guyana Graphic*" – 15th October, 1969.

[11] Issue of 28th August, 1969.

[12] Reported in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 16th February, 1970.

The government is therefore faced with serious problems in the attempt to make co-operatives dynamic and productive instruments, and when it is appreciated that this function would be over and above normal governmental operations the problems are compounded. One of the important matters which the government has recently tackled is a reorientation of the civil service away from its colonial features. As late as 1969 the Collins Commission wrote in the following terms: "The Public Service in Guyana is still very much a product of pre-independence days. Many of the essential features and attitudes of a colonial Civil Service still persist. Some of these features remain good and desirable, but many others seem no longer appropriate. The tasks of the Public Service today are those entrusted to it by an independent developing nation faced with an almost fantastic combination of problems. To deal effectively with these problems and to meet the high expectations of citizens, require a Public Service better geared to the present dynamic era than it now appears to be."[15]

It is partly in recognition of this criticism that government has proposed certain changes and reorganizations in its machinery. In the first place, as a mark of the new emphasis on co-operatives, responsibility for their growth and development falls within the portfolio of the Ministry of Economic Development. The importance of this fact is appreciated when it is known that the Prime Minister heads this ministry, and the intention is that the interests of co-operatives receive the greatest weight at the levels of the Cabinet, National Assembly, civil service, and in the country as a whole. Furthermore, a decision has been taken to have a complete reorganisation of the Co-operative Department dividing it into a number of sub-departments with a specialist at the head of each.[16] As an example of the reorganisation contemplated, the Prime Minister announced the intention of separating the section of the department dealing with registration from other sections "so that there will not be the frustrating experience which has come to so many people in the past".[17] In addition, a number of new posts have been created in the department and attempts made to fill those vacant for some time. Further, government has announced the policy of making studies in co-operatives compulsory at all levels of the educational system – from primary school to university.[18] It also subsidises a course on co-operative studies now being conducted at the Critchlow Labour College, which many officers of the Co-operative Department attend.

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[13] Carl Blackman, *op. cit.*

[14] "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 8th February, 1970.

[15] *The Public Service of Guyana*: *Report of the Commission of Inquiry* (Chairman Dr. B. A. N. Collins), May 26th, 1969.

[16] Report in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 20th October, 1969.

[17] *Ibid.*

Government Ministers have lost no opportunity in reminding civil servants of their responsibility, and that the failure or success of the movement would depend on their attitude and approach. For example, at the Annual General Meeting of the Civil Service Association (C.S.A.) the Prime Minister informed civil servants that unless they forgot the traditions of the public service of British Guiana, the Co-operative Republic would be a failure. He emphasised that the success of the venture hinged on "an efficient and dedicated public service".[19] Civil servants had to believe in the idea of the co-operative and co-operation. They had also to be prepared "to give intelligent and selfless service and must feel a sense of involvement with the rest of the community."[20]

The Prime Minister's remarks provoked a retort from the President of the C.S.A., which provides an insight into the thinking of civil servants on some of the factors which are likely to militate against the achievement of some of the goals set by the government. The President stated that the public service was suffering from a shortage of trained staff, apparent inability to recruit and retain staff, and poor and insanitary office accommodation. He also drew attention to the presence of "General Orders, Financial Regulations, Stores Regulations, and even Colonial Regulations which were framed in the colonial era" and were still applicable to the public service of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana.[21] He urged government to recognize the ability of Guyanese in preference to foreign experts, and advised that the revision of Regulations be treated as a matter of urgency. The task should be undertaken by officers assigned full-time for specific periods on these special jobs, and not by those who still carried out their normal duties which were in most cases in excess of a normal day's work.[22] The efficiency and effectiveness of the public service could be improved by taking steps to fill vacancies, retain trained staff and improve office accommodation. Better training courses with emphasis on the field of management, an area in which there were many problems, were also advocated as a remedy for some of the ills of the public service.[23]

It is a truism that the effectiveness of a government depends to a great extent on the attitude and performance of the civil service, and if morale is low this is bound to reflect on the performance of the civil service. For some time public servants had been agitating for an increase in salary and it is no doubt partly in recognition of the importance of a satisfied service, especially in the light of the new responsibilities which are devolving on it, that government has recently taken a decision to meet some of the demands of the public service.[24]

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[18] Vide speech read in the National Assembly by the President, reported in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 1st April, 1970.

[19] Report in the "*Sunday Graphic*" – 26th April, 1970.

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] For an account and criticism of the training now conducted in the public service see Harold A. Lutchman, *Training for the Public Service: The Case of Guyana* (unpublished, 1970).

Reorganisation in Other Areas

It has been suggested that the proposed reorganization of the governmental machinery does not go far enough and that consideration ought to be given to much more fundamental changes. For example, Dr. Ramsahoye has argued that in a co-operative republic, the whole context of the economy must become subject to change. The workers through co-operatives have to become trustees of the community and must operate and manage the economy in a manner in keeping with fundamental ideas of democracy. "Co-operatives," he contends, "can never succeed unless they have a lever to direct the exericse of both legislative and executive power".[25] They must ultimately become responsible for the country's economic planning and should elect Cabinet Ministers since it can hardly be considered democratic for Cabinet Ministers to determine economic policy for them on the basis of consultations which may never reach the stage of agreement having regard to competing interests.[26] Guyana according to this argument will know whether the government is serious when it announces plans for co-operatives to share in the exercise of legislative and executive power corresponding to the role they are intended to play in the economy of the country.[27]

It has also been suggested that there ought to be a separate Ministry of Co-operatives replacing the present arrangement by which the Co-operative Department merely serves as a division of the Ministry of Economic Development. The contention is that the latter as now constituted represents something of a hotch-potch since it also has responsibility for interior development, economic development generally (the Development Secretariat is located in the Ministry) and the Statistical Department. This arrangement has, however, been defended on the grounds that all these subjects are in some measure concerned with economic development and, in a small country such as Guyana, there must of necessity be a great deal of overlapping in the allocation of subjects to ministries. Another criticism is that the interests of co-operatives are likely to suffer because the Minister in charge of them is over-burdened. In addition to the heavy responsibilities of Prime Minister, he holds the portfolios of the Ministry of the Public Service and the Ministry of Economic Development. He is also the Minister of External Affairs and acting Minister of Local Government. It should, however, be noted that there is a Minister of State for External Affairs,[28] and a Minister without portfolio who are available to assist the Prime Minister with the work of certain aspects of his office and the Ministry of Economic Development. There are also Parliamentary Secretaries to the Prime Minister's office and the Ministry of Local Government. It is therefore the case that the Prime Minister merely possesses political responsibility for some subjects while day-to-day administrative responsibility resides with other ministers. The overriding consideration is that the subjects which fall under the Prime Minister's control are considered important enough for him to lend his weight to them.

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[24] Public Servants are to receive a pay-out of approximately $4m (G) by way of interim relief – see, for example, "*Evening Post*" – 1st April, 1970.

[25] "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 8th February, 1970.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] The person holding this post also serves as the Attorney-General.

Other closely related criticisms concern the administrative arrangements for over-all planning in the country. Even before the intention was announced of emphasising co-operatives, certain criticisms were levelled at the machinery, but the matter obviously assumes greater urgency in the light of the new developments. At present there exists a Cabinet sub-committee on economic matters consisting of the Prime Minister as Chairman, the Minister of Finance, the Minister of Trade, the Minister of Works, Hydraulics and Supply, the Minister of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Minister without Portfolio. The Permanent Secretary to each of the foregoing Ministers (except the Minister without Portfolio who has no Permanent Secretary), together with the technical specialists attached to the ministries, attend as advisers. In addition, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary to the Treasury, the Chief Statistician, the Government's Technical Specialist, the Chief Planning Officer, the General Manager of the Guyana Development Corporation, the Governor of the Bank of Guyana and the Economic Adviser to the Ministry of Economic Development attend meetings of the sub-committee. Other ministers and their advisers attend when matters affecting their ministries are considered. The sub-committee has the function of first receiving and approving, from a point of policy, all economic matters before their submission to the Cabinet for final decision. No such matter should be submitted to the Cabinet before it is first considered at the level of the sub-committee though, as is to be expected in such matters, because of the urgency of a particular matter and the prestige of a minister, ways are sometimes found of circumventing the established procedure.

By its composition it should be apparent that although the Cabinet sub-committee is involved at an important level of the planning process, it is by no means equipped to carry out the function of co-ordinating the economic affairs of the various ministries and governmental agencies. Therefore, with a view to ensuring proper consideration in sub-committee, any matter involving a charge on capital funds is first considered by the Ministry of Economic Development. The latter also has the duty of reporting on progress on the government's development programme. These duties require that the Ministry maintains contact with the various governmental agencies since it has to advise on the feasibility or otherwise of their projects. The actual work in this regard falls on the Development Secretariat which is understood to have the function of revision, evaluation, co-ordination, progress chasing, progress reporting, controlling technical assistance and many advisory functions. No matter is supposed to reach the sub-committee before it is first considered by the Secretariat. Similarly, matters emanating from the Development Secretariat, likely to affect individual ministries and departments, are first discussed with these agencies before submission to the sub-committee.

One of the difficulties experienced by the Development Secretariat in dealing with the various governmental agencies arises from the fact that in the majority of cases the latter do not have the kind of person who can "speak the language" of the secretariat nor possess the technical competence necessary to frame and evaluate economic proposals. As a consequence, much of this work falls on the secretariat and valuable time is lost in matters passing backwards and forwards between the secretariat and the agencies. Ideally, the best arrangement would be for each ministry or department to have its own planning unit and economists – an arrangement which already exists in the Ministries of Education, Agriculture and Natural Resources and Works, Hydraulics and Supply. But perhaps the more important defect in the planning mechanism in terms of achieving some of the goals of the Co-operative Republic is the absence of any machinery whereby the government co-ordinates the activities of the different sectors of the economy and involves the private sector in the planning exercise.

As already mentioned the private sector is envisaged as having an important role to play in the economy. According to the Minister of Trade, "This sector is expected to play a role even more important than that of the past not only from the point of view of expanding its operations within the new Republic, but also in its contribution, financial and otherwise, toward fostering the growth and development of the new co-operatives".[29]

A number of factors dictate the need for the establishment of appropriate machinery to involve the private sector in the planning process. There is some uneasiness in the sector regarding the exact intentions of government. They find it difficult to reconcile the government's stand for preferential treatment to co-operatives with the claim that it is by no means hostile to private enterprise. As the latter construe matters, government's policy would result in co-operatives competing with private enterprise and having the advantage of government on their side. The Guyana Manufacturers' Association, for example, expressed concern to the Minister of Finance about having to face unfair competition from co-operatives "which will enter into the manufacturing business with the advantage of being exempted from taxation."[30] At a meeting between the Prime Minister and the Georgetown Chamber of Commerce, the latter also sought clarification on a number of points. The Prime Minister felt the need to reassure them that government does not propose nationalising private businesses to make them available to co-operatives, and that co-operative ventures would be taxed like other business enterprises.[31]

According to one source, in the early stages co-operatives would have to concentrate on agriculture and livestock rearing while the economy would continue to depend on the private sector, as the public sector absorbed government spending on infra-structural development. In other words, the private sector will continue to be the backbone of the economy and, as such, will not thrive if the climate is one of insecurity. "Economic necessity therefore should determine that Government's attitude towards the private sector should not appear to be a matter of toleration until the co-operative sector is established."[32] This regrettably, is the feeling among the private sector. There is therefore a great need for the government to clarify its policy and establish adequate machinery for frequent dialogue and exchange of ideas and views with the private sector.[33] Much more than occasional policy statements seem necessary if government is to succeed in restoring and maintaining the confidence of the private sector, which must be convinced that they in fact have a role to play in the new scheme of things.

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[29] "*Guyana Graphic*" – 11th February, 1970.
[30] "*Sunday Graphic*" – 4th January, 1970.
[31] "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 26th October, 1969.

Quite apart from the need for confidence, at times the private and public sectors are in competition for scarce resources and this is particularly noticeable with qualified staff. Because salaries and conditions of service are generally more attractive in the private sector, the public service experiences difficulty in recruiting and retaining such staff. With the new emphasis on co-operatives, it is inevitable that the size of this problem will be enhanced since it is conceivable that co-operatives, too, will enter into competition for the relatively limited number of qualified persons. There is need to ensure that the private sector does not take action construed as hostile to the policies of the government. The Prime Minister himself provided evidence of this likelihood when he complained about what was termed a "new form of bribery" on the part of one section of the private sector. He cited the new increased rates offered by commercial banks on savings accounts as evidence of part of the battle, which had already begun, to undermine the co-operative system. The action of the commercial banks was born of a recognition that when the Co-operative Bank was started, it would move into the field of commercial banking with a view to mobilizing the savings of the small individual and "also go into the kind of development we want for Guyana".[34] Carl Blackman had previously commented on the possibility of this conflict of interest when he argued that it was unrealistic to expect that private enterprise would have co-operated "happily with a rival obviously favoured by Government, which with a good run of luck and prosperity would put . . . (them) out of business."[35]

In these circumstances, there is need for liaison between the different sectors, and it is true that at the present time the planning machinery is geared only to deal with the public sector. Machinery along the lines of the previously established National Economic Council may well serve the purpose. This was a body consisting of the Minister of Economic Development as Chairman, the Secretary to the Treasury, the Chief Planning Officer, the General Manager of the Guyana Development Corporation, the Governor of the Bank of Guyana, representatives of the Trade Union Movement and various sections of the private sector. It was established in 1966 "in accordance with the Government's policy of consultative democracy and in an effort to stimulate discussion of its economic policy, on as wide a basis as possible"[36] but only one meeting of the body was ever held. Any attempt to resuscitate the National Economic Council must take into account the new status assigned to co-operatives and provide them with appropriate representation.

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[32] "*Guyana Graphic*" – 9th February, 1970.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Address to the Women's Auxiliary of the People's National Congress reported in the "*Evening Post*" – 13th November, 1969.

[35] "*The Sunday Graphic*" – 18th October, 1969.

[36] Letters of appointment dated 23 May, 1966, addressed to members of the National Economic Council.

Viewed in the light of the goals of the Co-operative Republic, another weakness in the existing administrative structure concerns the machinery at the regional and local levels. If the government's programme is to be effective at all levels, as is intended, it is imperative that thought be given not only to the central machinery of government but to that with which the ordinary citizen is most likely to come into contact. The Prime Minister has announced that District Commissioners are to be regarded as middlemen between government and the community as translators of the concepts of the co-operative. They are believed to be in a position to train the people and "encourage them to pull their weight not only in their own interest but for the benefit of the nation".[37] Local authorities are expected to serve as the co-ordinating agencies at district level of the many co-operative groups which would be formed throughout Guyana. Full co-ordination among all government officers at district level is expected as a means of avoiding unnecessary wastage of effort and time.[38]

It is generally agreed that the present system of local government in Guyana is unsuited to the new tasks and thinking required of a developing country but, although the system has been under review since the early 1950s, with a view to effecting much needed reform,[39] progress in this direction has been remarkably slow. Government, however, announced the intention of holding the first local government elections in Guyana in more than 12 years, on 22nd June, 1970. These elections would not, however, be on a country-wide basis but were to be restricted to six areas.[40]

Apart from a suitable system of local government there is the belief that machinery along the lines of Regional Development Committees (R.D.Cs) would be useful. These bodies were first established in Guyana in the early 1950s as part of the Governmental machinery in promoting economic development but have since been inoperative. They existed in each administrative district on the coast with the District Commissioner of each district as chairman. Other members included the District Engineer, District Agricultural Officer and the District Co-operative Officer, the chairman of one or two of the larger local authorities in the particular administrative district, the Chairman of the Union of Local Authorities in the particular area or zone, and the officer in charge of the branch (or district) office of the Guyana Credit Corporation. The R.D.Cs undertook a number of tasks including recommending applications for loans from the Credit Corporation for housing, minor industrial enterprises and agricultural expansion. They also considered and approved applications for self-help schemes up to the value of $5,000.

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[37] Address by the Prime Minister to a conference of District Commissioners and Assistant District Commissioners – Report in "*Guyana Graphic*" – 11th February, 1970.

[38] *Ibid.*

[39] See Report on Local Government in British Guiana by A. H. Marshall (Argosy, Georgetown, 1954).

[40] Announcement by the Prime Minister, reported in the "*Guyana Graphic*" – 28th April, 1970. For a criticism of the Government's plan see article by F. H. W. Ramsahoye in the "*Weekend Post and Sunday Argosy*" – 10th May, 1970. See also Paul Singh, "*Regionalism and Local Government Reform*" – Thunder, Vol. 1, No. 2, October-December, 1969.
This article was written before the elections took place – Ed.

A number of area sub-committees were established to assist the R.D.Cs. These consisted of between 4 and 6 members and the chairman of a local authority was usually the chairman of one or more area sub-committees. Each sub-committee served two or three local authority areas or districts, but they also took into account representation of unorganized areas. Large farmers or other well-known public figures, therefore, sometimes served on them. The sub-committees did the first level processing of applications for loans and/or self-help schemes and because they were small and localized, members frequently had a good grasp of the needs of applicants, their credit-worthiness or otherwise, their experience as farmers or businessmen, or the capacity of groups to work together as a team on self-help projects. The District Agricultural Field Assistants, Co-operative Officers and other district government officers usually served as *ex-officio* members of sub-committees.

If the above arrangement is to serve in the new environment, however, consideration would have to be given to a number of changes designed to remove some of the weaknesses previously experienced. One of these was the fact that neither the R.D.Cs nor the sub-committees had the power to initiate measures but only considered those referred to them. They were therefore unable to put forward plans for community or rural economic development for the area or district for which they had responsibility. Another concerned the dominant position occupied by the District Commissioner, to whom all the members looked for leadership. His status was enhanced by the fact that he was responsible for recommending persons for appointment to the R.D.Cs and area sub-committees.

The number of officials who sat as members of the R.D.Cs was also considered a defect. Officials have not always proved dynamic in promoting and initiating social and economic change and development, since many tend to display an undue concern for "safe" administration. One of the changes must be to limit the number of officials and provide such co-operatives and business undertakings as are established with representation commensurate with their importance.

Co-operative Administration

The greatest area of difficulty in achieving some of the goals of the Co-operative Republic no doubt lies in the field of co-operative administration. It is by no means an easy task to build co-operatives to the point where they would occupy a position comparable to that of the private sector. Even if this is achieved, the goal of providing opportunities for the "small man" to participate in a meaningful way in the management of co-operative enterprises must pose certain problems. Apart from the "small man" not now possessing the expertise necessary to manage business enterprises, there is the belief that his participation would by no means be conducive to efficient and effective management. As Carl Blackman has argued, "it is all well and good to herald the era when the small man will be a real man. But the whole co-operative idea calls for consensus – and consensus is the negation of business which depends on snap decisions and, in the milder meaning of the word, ruthless policy."[41] Dr. Paul Singh, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Guyana, has pointed out that studies on British Retail Co-operatives "have provided unmistakable evidence of a profound shift from democratic tendencies to oligarchic tendencies."[42] The following characteristics are discernible:—

(*a*) the secular decline in the general level of membership participation;
(*b*) the direct inverse relationship between participation and size of societies;
(*c*) the growing influence in co-operative government of officials and experts;
(*d*) the high proportion of uncontested elections and the rarity of sitting members experiencing defeat in contested elections;
(*e*) the tendency to reduce the frequency of business meetings and to restrict their functions to purely co-operative trading matters;
(*f*) the tendency to lengthen the term of office of board members.[43]

It is beyond dispute that some of these features are very much in evidence in certain business enterprises in present-day Guyana. The ordinary shareholder for the most part is not particularly concerned with the details of management and decision-making and so long as he is getting a return considered adequate for his investment, he leaves the actual "business decisions" to the Board of Directors who are more or less sure to be returned to their positions. In theory, the highest policy-making authority is the general body of shareholders but, in practice, they seldom do more than ratify policy decisions submitted to them by the Board of Directors. This seems a natural consequence flowing from the objectives which such bodies set themselves, among which is the desire to achieve the highest level of profits in the most efficient manner. The ordinary shareholder, not being in possession of the facts or not having the requisite skills or training, cannot effectively participate in managing enterprises. This must of necessity be left with those who possess the technical know-how. There are parallel situations in the field of politics and government. A government once elected to power must be the authoritative decision-making body, and the mass of the people, who voted for it, do not have any but a passive role. There are some decisions which the government has to take without prior reference to the people, because it is in a better position to do so. It can call on the technical services of the civil service, something which is not possible for the ordinary citizen. It is felt that there is nothing necessarily undemocratic in such an arrangement since, in the first place, the government would have been vested with authority by the ordinary citizen, and secondly, the former would eventually have the final word at the next general elections. These facts are also true of the relationship between ordinary shareholders and the Boards of Directors of joint stock companies. There is no reason to believe that such co-operatives as may be established would be organized on different principles. They would, no doubt, aim at the most efficient form of arrangement, and try to operate profitably. In such circumstances, it is also likely that the actual running of co-operatives would be left to the "executive arm," and this would probably mean that the scope for participation and control by the ordinary member would be very little removed from that which exists in government and other business undertakings.

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[41] "*Sunday Graphic*" – 18th October, 1969.
[42] "*Sunday Graphic*" – 9th November, 1969.
[43] *Ibid.*

In spite of this there is no need to conclude like Dr. Singh, that "co-operation prepares the ground for authoritarian control. A self-elected few will exploit the simplicity, ignorance, credulity and lethargy of the overwhelming majority and dominate the co-operative society".[44] Much could perhaps be done to remove some of these dangers and make for more effective mass participation by training in requisite skills and the provision of an effective system of education in co-operativism and related subjects at all levels. Although education may not totally obviate the tendencies towards oligarchy and their consequences, it may nevertheless make democratic ideals a greater possibility by helping to create an enlightened "mass base". It could be inculcated into members of co-operatives that they have a greater role and interest in the matter than passively receiving, and awaiting the receipt of, profits. If the latter attitude is allowed to dominate it may well defeat some of the objectives and assumptions underlying the move towards co-operativism.

Conclusion

It is only too often forgotten that the extent to which a particular economic, social or political movement is successful may well depend on the strength of the existing administrative machinery, which generally has the task of giving concrete form to the movement. The attempt to establish a Co-operative Republic in Guyana is by no means different in this regard. In initiating the movement very little systematic thought was given to the adequacy of the administrative machinery to sustain it. This is evidenced by the fact that, although the Collins Commission on the Public Service was appointed in May, 1968 and submitted its Report in May, 1969, the latter does not contain a single reference to the Co-operative Republic and its likely impact on the machinery of government and the public service. It may well be argued that, in view of the great emphasis placed on the new developments, there is need for a fresh examination of the public service in the light of the implications of the Co-operative Republic. It should be noted, however, that the government has recently appointed a very high-powered team to review the existing development plan with a view to drafting one more suited to a Co-operative Republic. This team will give consideration to the adequacy, or otherwise, of the existing machinery to implement the plan, and to some of the administrative problems involved.

The attempt to establish a Co-operative Republic in Guyana should demonstrate some of the administrative problems which confront developing countries in their efforts to better the lot of their citizens and effect changes in their circumstances. Though faced with serious shortages of resources (both human and material), nevertheless they are urged on by their awareness of how serious their problems are. They frequently feel that time will not permit them to plan their development with the degree of consideration (of the relevant facts and their likely implications) that should be given. They have to make a positive response to the demands from the masses for development. At the same time, precipitate action may create further new problems of its own. This possibility does not however deter the leaders of the developing countries since they generally hope to learn from their mistakes and intend to take corrective action when they occur; an attitude which prevails in Guyana at the present time.

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[44] *Ibid.*

Increased Government Control of Buganda's Financial Sinews since the Revolution of 1966

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THE quest for a more equitable allocation of resources and income in all parts of Uganda, has gained more commitment, support and above all possibilities and credibility since the revolutionary changes which abolished "federalism" in Uganda and Buganda's special privileges and political hegemony. Indeed even before 1967 the Government was exposed to pressure from the "neglected" areas to rectify the imbalance of not only economic resources allocation but of political "goods" as well.[1] For example, members of the West Nile District Council proposed that their district should be represented in the cabinet, claiming that industries were being established only in the districts which were represented in the cabinet and that tractors were only given to such districts.[2] The determination of the government of Uganda to distribute the economic growth and social services has been boldly and publicly declared and reiterated. Only recently the Minister of Planning and Economic Development Mr. J. M. Okae who was touring Lango District, declared, "economic development of Uganda, is aimed at bringing those areas neglected by the British Administration in line with other parts of the country".[3] He added, "during the colonial administration, some areas were not allowed to grow some crops, and others were not given the essential services."

It is the contention of this paper that the present government's rigorous control of the financial sinews of the districts, has enhanced its capacity to redistribute income and resources more equitably throughout Uganda. This is so because some significant services and resources which had been distributed inequitably to the Kingdoms and districts and which could not be controlled by the Central Government because of the constitutional and political tangles, were reclaimed by the Government following the major constitutional changes of 1967. The Central Government's control of the financial sinews of Buganda has been selected to represent what is taking

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[1] These included the quest to receive similar political attention and the demand that more tribal languages be broadcast on radio Uganda.

[2] West Nile District Council Minutes 28th August, 1965, Min. 72/65.

[3] *The People* (Kampala) September 8, 1969, p.10.

place in other parts of Uganda because (*a*) Buganda was the major source of resistance to Central Government's control over her affairs and finances. Furthermore, her successful defiance of the Central Government's control, was in turn emulated by other parts of Uganda. Indeed the Munster Report of 1961 made the same observation in these words:

> "It is hardly too much to say that every serious problem which we encountered in Uganda had its roots in the Buganda Problem. In local government matters, for instance, the fact that the Buganda government has been able to defy the Central Government's financial controls, has naturally encouraged financial irresponsibility elsewhere".[4]

And so by controlling Buganda's "defiance" which flourished from the colonial days up to 1967, other areas have been easily controlled by the Central Government. (*b*) The historical concentration of the resources and services in Buganda has meant that the major task of correcting the "imbalance" has its major roots in Buganda.

In order to appreciate fully the impact and the importance of the present grip which the central government has over the four districts which comprise the former Kabaka's kingdom,[5] it is necessary to recall the period when Buganda was so politically powerful that she could not only defy a lot of the central government's control but could also hold the national balance of power. The Uganda independence constitution of 1962, enshrined Buganda's special privileges which she had reaped since the 1900 Agreement which was made between the King of Buganda and the Protectorate government.[6] Her relative financial autonomy was also confirmed under schedule 9 of the 1962 constitution under which her independent sources of revenue included graduated tax, assigned revenue raised in Buganda from petrol and diesel duty (with a minimum yield guaranteed), statutory contribution from the general revenue (not to be reduced without consultation with the Kabaka's government) and revenue from stamp duty on *mailo* transfers. In accordance with her wishes, Buganda was excluded from the local authorities grant structures. This was so because *inter alia*, Buganda wanted to steer clear from any controls which are normally associated with grants from the central government. Her services included senior education, forestry, hospitals, agricultural marketing, water supply, veterinary matters, co-operatives, markets, housing, town planning, high court matters, police, prisons, public works, etc.

The central government hardly exercised any significant control over Buganda's expenditure and her estimates of revenue. Indeed before submitting estimates to the *Lukiiko* (Buganda's parliament) the *Omuwanika* (Minister of Finance) was merely required to cause the estimates to be sent to the Minister of the central government of Uganda responsible for finance after which the Buganda government was merely expected to consider the observations of the Minister of Finance in the central government.[7] Otherwise it was Buganda's Public Accounts Committee which was entrusted with the duty of dealing with excess of unauthorised expenditure of funds and to take any measures it considered necessary in order to ensure that the funds of Buganda's government were properly and economically spent.[8]

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[4] Report of the Uganda Relationships Commission (Entebbe: Government Printer, 1961), p. 23. It was under the chairmanship of the Right Hon. The Earl of Munster.

[5] In 1967 the former kingdom of Buganda was divided into 4 Districts.

[6] For more details see A. Nsibambi, "The Rise and Fall of Federalism in Uganda," *East Africa Journal, December*, 1966.

It should be noted that Buganda's capacity for asserting her financial autonomy sprung from her political strength which was a result of her apparent and *de facto* political cohesiveness. It will be recalled that just before independence, Buganda organized a "political party" called Kabaka Yekka which enabled her to send 21 representatives to the National Assembly who were elected by the Lukiiko – a procedure which for some time ensured that Buganda's representatives in the National Assembly acted as a group to safeguard the interests and demands of Buganda. The Uganda People's Congress (UPC) which had won 37 seats in the Assembly, formed an alliance with Kabaka Yekka in order to form a National Government. The Democratic Party which had won 24 seats, became the Opposition Party. Under this setting, Buganda held the national balance of political power and could thus assert her financial autonomy.

The reports of the Auditor-General on the Accounts from 1962 onwards, revealed clearly Buganda's failure to control her expenditure – a practice which was emulated in other districts whose financial sense of responsibility was lacking as well. For example, the Auditor-General observed that Buganda's accounts which ended 30th June, 1962 were received for audit on December 31st, 1963. Thus the requirement of article 33 (2) of the constitution of Buganda that the accounts be rendered for audit within a period of four months from the end of the financial year, had been contravened.[9] He drew attention to expenditure amounting to £126,796 remaining unauthorized. He pointed out that the total number of queries in respect of previous years to which replies were still awaited was 522. Similar financial improprieties occurred in the other districts which emulated Buganda. For example in Toro District, excess expenditure totalling £1,296 was noted as well as unvouched expenditure or incompletely vouched expenditure amounting to £9,255. In Ankole District unvouched expenditure totalled £42,182. In Bunyoro excess expenditure totalling £6,891 remained unauthorized. In Busoga expenditure incurred without due authority amounted to £276,835. Unvouched or incompletely vouched expenditure in 1962/63 amounted to £4,267. In Lango District, excess expenditure of £7,079 on 20 items was not covered by proper authority. And in some cases mileage was claimed for journeys which did not appear to be connected with the duties of the posts held by the claimants.[10]

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[7] See schedule 1 to the 1962 Constitution Article 33(4). Buganda tended to disregard the observations of the Minister of Finance in the Central Government especially during her period of political hegemony.

[8] *Ibid.* Article 34.

[9] See Report of the Controller and Auditor-General on the Accounts of H.H. The Kabaka's Government for the year ended 30th June, 1962, p. 1.

[10] See Report of the Controller and Auditor-General on the Accounts of the Toro Kingdom for the period 1st July, 1962 to 31st December, 1963, and for Ankole, Bunyoro, Busoga and Lango covering the same period.

Considering that the recurrent and non-recurrent revenue of Bunyoro, Ankole, Lango and Toro ranged from about £400,000 to £800,000, unauthorized expenditure constituted a big fraction of their revenues. This was equally true of Buganda whose revenue revolved around three to four million pounds.[11]

Thus under this setting the weak central government could not politically and in some cases constitutionally exercise any meaningful control over Buganda's financial expenditure. When, however, politicians defected from Kabaka Yekka and joined the U.P.C., Buganda's balancing power was lost. Henceforth U.P.C. could form a strong national government without the assistance of Kabaka Yekka. Her position was made even stronger by other politicians who defected from the Democratic opposition party and who joined U.P.C.

The revolutionary changes of 1966–67 which involved the abolition of federalism, and the reduction of Buganda's independent sources of revenue and services[12] and the division of the former kingdom into four district[13] administrations whose finances are subjected to the firm control of the Government, constituted a fundamental move of abolishing Buganda's special position. Henceforth there has been a strong tendency towards centralization of powers by the government and this paper will only tackle the financial aspect of the phenomenon.

According to Section 46 of the Local Administration's Act, the Administration is empowered to raise revenue from graduated tax up to a maximum of 600 shillings per annum per taxpayer, rates, market dues, fees, fines, licences and permits, interest on investments, royalties, donations, and other revenue collected by district land committees, and such other revenues as the Minister of the Government shall approve. In addition, Administrations receive grants from Central Government.

The recurrent revenue and expenditure of the four districts may be summarised as follows:[14]

	Year	*Revenue Shs.M*	*Income per capita*	*Expenditure Shs.M*
East Mengo ...	1968	15	24	12
	1969	17	27	13
West Mengo ...	1968	8	18	8
	1969	11	25	10
Masaka	1968	9	19	9
	1969	9	20	9
Mubende ...	1968	5	25	5
	1969	6	27	6

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[11] Busoga's revenue was in the range of about one million pounds per year.

[12] The de-transferred services include education (especially teachers' salaries) forestry, veterinary services, land board, police etc.

[13] East Mengo, West Mengo, Masaka and Mubende Districts.

[14] *Source*: District Treasurers of the four Districts and the Approved Estimates. It should be noted that the figures for 1969 are merely estimates.

Despite the fact that Mubende District shows income per capita which is comparable to that of East Mengo, it is the poorest district in Buganda because *inter alia* income is poorly distributed in the area. Furthermore, it lacks important investment projects. In fact, it is only Mubende District which received a block grant of 200,000 shillings in 1968. A similar sum was promised for 1969.

In order to dispose of the assets and liabilities which belonged to the former Kingdom of Buganda, a special account was created under Schedule 4 of the Local Administrations Act, 1967. Part II of the schedule stipulates that all property, assets, funds, rights, liabilities and obligations which belonged to or were binding upon the government of the former kingdom of Buganda, immediately before the commencement of the constitution, shall be deemed to have been vested in the government. Section 3, Part II of the Schedule empowered the relevant Minister (i.e. of Regional Administrations) to make provisions by statutory instrument for the management, disposal or otherwise dealing with any property vested in the Government for the benefit of the districts of East Mengo, Masaka, Mubende and West Nile. The first distribution of Buganda's special account was made on a population basis following the 1959 census as follows:[15]

District	*Amount*	*Percentage of total population of Buganda*
East Mengo	2.5 million shs	35%
West Mengo	1.7 million shs	25%
Masaka	1.7 million shs	26%
Mubende	0.8 million shs	13%

East Mengo is economically the most advanced of the four Districts. This is so because there are many important economic activities which are taking place in the area such as sugar, tea and coffee estates, cocoa in Bugerere and ranching in Buruli County, besides the size of the population and the ease of carrying overhead costs which have contributed to the overall wealth. In fact East Mengo had a surplus balance of nearly 3m shillings in 1968.

The surplus balances are used to create a reserve fund and for financing capital projects, which have included building residential houses, medical units, sub-dispensaries, bridges and markets.

R. A. Stevens has observed "that English local government authorities do not hold reserve funds, since it is considered wrong that money should be accumulated out of rates or taxes paid by one set of payers to be used possibly years later to provide Capital works for possibly a quite different set of payers".[16] How can the local administration be vindicated for accumulating reserve funds to finance capital projects? Because the funds are accumulated for one year – and not for years – and they are used the following year. Consequently the majority of the people who pay for them, get the benefits the following year. Furthermore, capital projects are not only financed from the reserve fund; some of the money is borrowed from the Local Authorities Loan Fund to finance capital projects.

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[15] It is hoped to distribute the rest of the Account according to the latest population Census of 1969.

[16] *Journal of African Administration*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1949, p. 71.

It has already been pointed out that the central government which was weak could not control the financial sinews of the robust sub-political systems notably the financial linchpin of the Kingdom of Buganda and indeed throughout the country. Thus local authorities faced deficit budgets year after year. Professor Colin Leys has observed, "Acholi has probably followed a fairly sophisticated tactic by improving tax collection, escaping blame on that score, while on the other hand budgeting for expenditure which produces a large deficit, and so both forcing the Minister to accept the odium of vetoing new items of expenditure and – possibly – creating more pressure to meet some of the new proposals indirectly by means of an increased deficit grant."[17]

It should also be noted that because local authorities lacked the resources to carry out all the functions for which they were responsible, local politicians solved this problem by excessive deficit budgeting. And as Professor Leys says, "in the end the estimates had in effect to be written by the (Central) Ministry in the form in which they were prepared to approve and, when finally published by the Acholi District Administration, some of the 'Explanatory Notes' appended to them served the function not of explaining what was in the estimates as printed, but what would have been in them if the Council had not been frustrated by the Minister."[18] And thus following so much glaring financial irresponsibility in Districts and following the removal of Buganda's political hegemony which was a constant source of inspiration and emulation to Districts, the government decided to assert her authority and control all Districts in Uganda without exception.

And so under the new system, the Districts, which will receive grants, are informed in advance as well as those which will not receive them. Also the Ministry sends to the Districts a letter of guidance before they make their estimates for the year. There can be no question of Districts sending inflated and deficit budgets to the Ministry unless they are authorized to do so. Districts are also required to have reserve funds to meet emergencies and to finance future capital projects. Indeed some heads may be placed under R.I.E. (Requisition to Incur Expenditure). This means that those heads are not to be committed without further reference to the Ministry of Regional Administrations. This is a safeguard against revenue shortfall and release is considered later in the year in the light of progress in tax collection. By this means local authorities are taught to be prudent – similarly on the revenue side, the old tactic of inflated estimates of revenue to justify heavy expenditure and in reality to hide deficit budgeting, has now been stopped.

It is important to note that the block grant is a significant tool of redistributing revenue to the less developed areas of Uganda. The Minister of Regional Administrations has explained how this is calculated:

"There is only one type of grant towards recurrent expenditure which is known as the block grant. This is a general grant of a deficiency grant nature . . . The grant is calculated to meet the gap (if any) between potential direct revenue and estimated requirements for recurrent expenditure. The potential direct revenue is calculated on a statistical basis, taking into account population and relative per capita income in the case of assessing rates. The estimated requirement for recurrent expenditure is based upon a formula taking 1967 totals (less certain economies) as a base line and projecting individual service expenditure according to national maintenance standards and development targets." The economies alluded to in the passage refer to the costs of the de-transferred services such as forestry, education, police, etc. which are now borne by central government. Their cost to the district prior to the major constitutional changes of 1967 is shown in a separate annexe.

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[17] Colin Leys, *Politicians and Policies: An Essay on Politics in Acholi, Uganda, 1962-65.* (Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967), p. 40.

[18] *Ibid.* p. 28.

The following table shows the grants which were paid to District Administrations by the government during 1967, 1968 and 1969 – it will be noted that the three most developed districts did not qualify for any grant:

Grants paid to District Administrations by Government during 1967, 1968 and 1969

	Name of Authority	1967	1968	1969 *Estimate*
1.	Acholi	4,812,450	1,363,281	1,782,880
2.	Ankole	6,142,910	61,652	468,100
3.	Bugisu	4,149,485	—	—
4.	Bukedi	5,902,260	1,052,200	1,247,660
5.	Bunyoro	4,702,980	2,076,108	2,463,480
6.	Busoga	6,701,280	1,345,825	1,125,000
7.	Karamoja	4,296,330	4,572,878	4,825,260
8.	Kigezi	5,840,560	999,430	1,320,340
9.	Lango	4,752,140	1,082,548	1,748,690
10.	Madi	1,272,820	691,801	724,520
11.	Sebei	894,350	707,045	623,460
12.	Teso	5,341,070	244,000	1,057,600
13.	Toro	3,668,100	—	—
14.	West Nile	5,414,960	849,404	1,242,880
15.	Mubende	—	200,004	200,240
16.	Masaka	—	—	—
17.	E. Mengo	—	—	—
18.	W. Mengo	—	—	—

Source: Ministry of Regional Administrations.
The figures are in shillings.

Since the government took over the burden of paying the salaries of teachers those Districts which open new schools must do so in accordance with the development programme as approved by the Ministry of Education if they expect to receive the financial assistance of meeting teachers' salaries. The development plan which is followed by the Ministry aims at giving equitable distribution of goods which in practice entails giving more assistance to the less developed areas of Uganda. And so all the controls which are exercised when the block grant is given to the Districts assist in the task of re-allocating services and income to the less developed areas.

This method of re-distributing income and services has a useful political advantage because (a) most citizens find it difficult to discern all the dimensions of calculating the block grant and so are usually willing to accept the advice of experts in the relevant financial intricacies. (b) The basic philosophy of assisting the less developed areas to acquire "national" standards is on the whole defensible to the majority of citizens. (c) While the impact of the block grant is significant, its effect of redistributing income and services is felt in gradual stages.

At this point, it seems appropriate to pose this question: Is the control from the Ministry of Regional Administrations irksome or not? This is an important question because democracy and local initiative are eroded when the central government exercises severe financial controls over Districts.

If the Minister's powers are looked at theoretically, they put him in a powerful position. For example, under Section 9 (3) of the Local Administrations Act, 1967, he may by statutory instrument dissolve a council at any time if he alone is satisfied that it is in the public interest so to do. This section gives him legal power to overcome resistance in a "defiant" local administration. In fact all councillors in Buganda were nominated by the Minister and they are to this extent dependent on him for their political survival in the council. Draft financial estimates of the finance committee are sent to him first and he makes what he deems to be the necessary alterations and sends them back to the committee which submits them to the council. After the council has debated and passed them, they are sent to the Minister for the final approval. Under Section 58 of the Act, he may approve or disapprove the estimates as a whole, disapprove any particular item or items in the estimates while approving the remainder of the estimates, require that before expenditure on any item is incurred, his specific approval to that expenditure is first obtained; or reduce the amount that may be spent on any particular item or items. Having sketched the Minister's powers, which appear so complete, it is proper to examine how they have been exercised in practice.

In general, since all the councillors are of course aware that they were nominated by the Minister and since they are also aware that Buganda is under emergency laws, they have proceeded cautiously in their deliberations except on the issue of their personal allowances which they have claimed to be far from adequate. Indeed, the removal of the Kabaka and Buganda's political hegemony was such a fundamental shock that a militant former Minister in the former Kabaka's government by the name of Abu Mayanja declared in the National Assembly after the revolution, "I believe that there is now no longer any person in Uganda who does not know where power lies. I believe that the days of the struggle of power, which led us to the unfortunate situation that we passed through, are now happily passed".[19]

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[19] *Uganda Parliamentary Debates, Second Series*, Vol. 73, Second Session, 1967-8, July, p. 666.

Since, however, councillors have not felt inhibited and "cautious" in pressing for increased allowances, it is worth examining that issue, in particular the East Mengo controversy about allowances.

One councillor in the name of all councillors of East Mengo, complained about the allowance of 250/–, as being too low compared with the responsibility they hold and the dignity they have in the district. He added that councillors travel widely in their constituencies in order to explain to the people the policy of the government and its objectives and that consequently so much of the allowance is spent on travelling expenses and that they are left without the means to buy food or clothing. He further argued that because their allowances were too little the people they represent tended to look down upon them.

Then another councillor proposed the following increases:—[20]

	Member's allowance	*Given*	*Should receive*
(*a*)	Chairman	shs. 700/– p.m.	shs. 1,500/– p.m.
	Deputy Chairman	shs. 300/– p.m.	shs. 1,000/– p.m.
	Councillors (46)	shs. 250/– p.m. each	shs. 750/– p.m. each
(*b*)	Sitting Allowance	Nil	shs. 60/– per person per sitting
(*c*)	Night Allowance	shs. 15/– per night	shs. 15/– per night

He concluded by saying that if his recommended figures were passed by the council, they should be included in the Draft Estimates of 1968.

He was seconded by the deputy chairman of council who rejected the idea of approving 1968 estimates without incorporating the proposed scheme into them.

A vote was taken and the results were as follows:—
Those in favour of the allowances as they appeared in the Draft Estimates of 1968 and who at the same time favoured writing separately to the Minister with a request for the allowances to be increased were six. Those who favoured including the proposed increase in the allowances in the Draft Estimates of 1968 were 32. One person abstained from voting. The Secretary-General then warned the councillors that if they considered that point to be the most important of all, it was better to suspend the debate so that they could write a letter to the Minister requesting him to confirm the proposed allowances. Councillor A. Kasujja urged members to take the Secretary-General's advice and it was eventually accepted. Consequently the councillors resolved to write a separate letter to the Minister about the matter.

In West Mengo, when one councillor complained that the allowance given to them was far too little and it was suggested that the council should appoint a committee to see the Minister about the matter, the chairman ruled that it was a waste of time to discuss that matter in detail because the members' allowance was covered in a circular from the Ministry of Regional

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[20] Minutes 17/67 and 23/67 of the Meeting of the East Mengo District Council 4-7, December, 1967. (Each councillor gets 250 shillings per month as his allowance.)

Administrations.[21] The issue of the councillors' allowances raised serious concern among councillors in all the four Districts and it has been discussed here at length because it gives rise to three interesting observations:—

First, the Minister refused to accept the proposals for increased allowances for councillors. Standardization of allowances throughout Uganda was one of his major considerations. For while the cost of the standard of living is not uniform throughout Uganda, if one started varying allowances in the light of the cost of living Buganda districts would be among the few areas which would merit special consideration but this move would be reminiscent of Buganda's special position and it would thus be repugnant to one of the major messages of the revolution – namely the abolition of these special privileges. No doubt if Buganda councillors had obtained higher allowances, arguments would have been advanced to justify similar increases throughout the country.

Secondly, all the councillors in Buganda were nominated by the Minister and so their claim of representing people's views and wishes is questionable. In fact it is widely claimed that many of them either hardly visit their constituencies save during elections.* The effectiveness of councillors in discussing crucial matters such as the draft estimates, has been wanting. It is perhaps questionable whether they deserve higher allowances.

One active councillor admitted to the author that his keenness to visit the people of his constituency was reduced by their political indifference and sometimes political antagonism.

Thirdly, since most of the councillors fully realise that power lies with the central government and are conscious that they were nominated to office, they have been characterized by extreme caution in handling matters which involve "questioning" the power and the authority of the Ministry of Regional Administrations. But the question of allowances was dear enough to them to "risk" incurring ministerial displeasure. The struggle in East Mengo about the allowances between the Secretary-General and most of the councillors displayed an important perception gap, which exists between those who have been "politically initiated" and those who have as yet to grasp the rudiments and subtle forces of politics.

The government's control has been particularly quick to extend to those areas where the councillors display ignorance regarding the limits of their power. An interesting example is illustrated in Mubende District when the council of Mubende sat from 22nd to 23rd January, 1969, to consider amended draft estaimates. One councillor moved that the council be adjourned and be recalled after the members had studied the estimates[22] because they had been given to them only a day before the meeting. The councillors were soon instructed by the Ministry that adjournment of the district council for a month was unacceptable. The council was recalled and so on the 29th January, they discussed the estimates from 2.30 p.m. and by 4.15 p.m. on the same day, they had passed them.

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[21] West Mengo District Council Minutes, October to December, 1967, Minutes 19/67.

* *Councillors in the Buganda districts only have been nominated and not elected, vacancies are filled by way of nomination* – Ed.

[22] Mubende District Council Minutes 22nd-23rd January, 1969, Minute 4/69.

On this occasion, the government's insistence that the council should not delay discussing the estimates seems to have been a practical measure because the essential work had already been done by both the finance committee and the Ministry of Regional Administrations. When full council meets the estimates are in viable shape and few chances remain of effectively changing them. To this extent, the councillors largely indulge in a rubber stamping exercise when they meet to approve the estimates. And thus there was no point why the councillors of Mubende were taking so long before dealing with their current financial business.

It is significant to note that the councils have come to realise that their involvement in the discussion of the estimates is largely an exercise in rubber-stamping what is in fact prepared by the Finance Committee and the Ministry of Regional Administrations. Consequently they are spending less time on estimates. For example, the Council of West Mengo discussed the Draft Estimates for 1968 from 12.15 p.m. to 2.15 p.m. which was a period of two hours.

Another area of irritation to the districts, over which the government exercises control, concerns trading centres. Some officials of the local Administrations argue that they spend much money developing trading centres and that as soon as some of the centres attain a reasonable degree of development, thus being important sources of revenue, the government "takes them over".[23] This practice makes district administrations reluctant to continue spending heavily on developing these centres. The Ministry's answer to this complaint was that district administrations tend to be more interested in getting revenue from trading centres than in developing them and that on the whole, the districts do not have the money, the skill and the experience to transform some of the centres, which are chronically poor, into viable ones.

It would appear that perhaps a more "diplomatic" procedure involving an impartial body of experts, might be usefully adopted before the government takes over "controversial" trading centres.

In concluding the discussion on the government's financial control over the four districts, the writer would wish to observe that, in practice, it is pretty rigorous and that sometimes it is irksome to the "local bosses"[24] who feel irritated and sometimes snubbed, especially when a District Commissioner who is sometimes a youngish graduate from Makerere University College either stops or queries certain items relating to their expenditure. The firm control of the central government is felt more strongly in Buganda than in some other Districts because (a) Buganda has hitherto been used to a tradition of financial autonomy and consequently she has had to adjust radically to the revolutionary system under which she has to receive and obey a routine supply of directives from the Ministry of Regional Administrations. (b) Since Buganda and to a certain extent other parts of Uganda, have been passing through the teething problems of the revolution, the government has been determined to do at least two things: first to keep a firm grip on the financial affairs of all Districts in Uganda in order to avoid repeating previous financial irresponsibility in Districts and to consolidate the streamlined system of local administration; secondly to wipe out what was described by one official as the "Mengo[25] mentality". This may briefly be described as being characterised by the politics of litigation, quest for autonomy, struggle for power between the former Kabaka's government and the central government, and relishing arguments. The Ministry of Regional Administrations has particularly been strict on preventing "unnecessary" expenditure, on prestige projects and on unproductive overheads such as mileage claims and allowances. It also strongly discourages spending money which a District is not likely to either raise or realise. This control may impinge upon local initiative, which at times requires deficient financing,[26] and taking financial risks. As Districts become more responsible and viable financially and as the residual birth pangs of the revolution subside, one hopes that more local autonomy will be granted to them.

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[23] "taking over by the government" is somewhat misleading because the government's intention appears to have favoured absorbing these trading centres into the existing viable municipal councils.

[24] Secretaries-General. The controls are irksome in the sense that prior permission is required to spend even the money which they have saved.

It is pertinent to close this discussion by observing that before the changes effected in 1967, even Districts which did not have constitutional financial autonomy which Buganda had, practised financial irresponsibility and they got away with it.[27] This seems to show that even if the central government had powers, irresponsibility was not easy to check. Accordingly, one is persuaded to ask,[28] will the new controls prove more effective unless the central government actually takes over local administration – i.e. abolishes it? The controls have so far worked because of two major reasons:

First, before the revolution, the central government had formal powers to deal at least more directly with Districts affairs. The formal powers, however, were not backed by political power most of which was in the hands of the former Kingdom of Buganda. It should be added at once that Buganda's political power of holding the national government at ransom was buttressed by the constitutional safeguards under which Buganda had independent sources of revenue and powers of legislation [29] which could not be interfered with, without infringing the 1962 "quasi-federal" constitution unless the relevant special majorities were mastered. And so Buganda's political hegemony made it possible for even the Districts which did not have constitutional autonomy to acquire it in practice because the central government was politically weak. And thus the "unexpected" and rather dramatic abolition of Buganda's special position and hegemony which was followed by the streamlining of local administration, has so far provided a significant psychological and political atmosphere of accepting controls from the government. Secondly, the Institute of Public Administration and the Ministry of Regional Administrations are paying more attention at arranging conferences, seminars and orientation courses for civil servants. This has meant that civil servants who mismanaged affairs of local administration because they were *inter alia* ignorant about the intricacies of say finance are being provided with the necessary skills. I should add that even the Secretaries-General and their assistants who are important local political bosses, have been continuously exposed to these important seminars. Indeed only recently, they attended a seminar in which local finance was discussed in detail. In this way, local politicians are discouraged from looking at technical matters in purely political terms. Furthermore, if Secretaries-General are tempted to incur unauthorized expenditure, they have to contend with the District Commissioners who are authorized to strike out unauthorized items.

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[25] Mengo was the seat of the former Kabaka's government.

[26] Deficit financing in the writer's opinion should be confined to capital projects which can generate the production of other goods.

[27] West Nile is a case in point.

[28] A question which Professor Colin Leys has been prepared to pose.

[29] See for example schedules 7 and 9 to the 1962 Constitution.

The acceptance of controls by districts especially by those which comprise the former Kingdom of Buganda, has enhanced the capacity of the central government to re-allocate resources through the use of the block grant and other methods. It remains to be seen however, how the government will continue to handle this crucial and delicate task of correcting the economic imbalance in Uganda, especially if it is remembered that the phenomenon is due to ecological as well as historical circumstances.

Colonial Government and Populist Reform: the case of the Ivory Coast—Part 2

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Local Administration at Independence and After

In the January Number I discussed the organisation and development of French colonial administration in the Ivory Coast, examining particularly the attitudes of the French and the Ivoirien élite towards local government reform in the forties and fifties. I argued that the form of local government proposed by the colonial administration (that of the supervised rural commune) and the emphasis by the administration on the need for a "coordinating" official involved a reassertion of the status of the generalist administrator, under the banners of "democracy" and "development".

This article is concerned with factors affecting the choice of a structure for local administration after independence. I try to show that, while there was, structurally, a notable degree of continuity from colonial government, the main feature of reform was an attempt to institute the French metropolitan style of local administration. The result was a structure which was different in important respects from the metropolitan model but not necessarily in ways which made it an economic or effective structure for a developing country.[1]*

Transitional arrangements, 1949-61

Despite a movement in the mid-fifties to establish rural communes, the units of local administration in 1959 (the year before independence) were the same as in 1945 – the provincial *cercles* (nineteen of them) divided into *subdivisions* (fifty in all) under the generalist *commandants de cercle* and *chefs de subdivision.*

In March 1959 the nineteen *cercles* were grouped into four departments to form constituencies for elections to the Legislative Assembly and to departmental general councils.[2] (The councils, though duly elected, were not in fact given functions until 1961 and thereafter did not exist as policy-making or even consultative bodies.)[3] The four departments were made into administrative units by a law of September 1959.[4] Again, the reform was superficial: the *cercles* survived, under the title of sub-prefectures, and the *subdivisons* survived, as *circonscriptions administratives.*

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[1] For comparative material on other French speaking-West African countries, see: T. G. Brierly, "The Evolution of Local Administration in French-speaking West Africa", Journal of Local Administration Overseas, vol. V, no. 1, pp. 56-68, and M. J. Campbell, T. G. Brierly, and L. F. Blitz, *The Structure of Local Government in West Africa*, The Hague, 1965.

* I would like to thank the Minister of the Interior of the Ivory Coast, M. Nanlo Bamba, and the officials of his Ministry and of the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* who gave me every assistance while carrying out the field-work on which this article is based.

[2] *Loi* 59-5 of March 28th, 1959. The departments bore regional titles: north, south-west, south-east and centre.

The departments were placed under the control of prefects, responsible to the Minister of the Interior and acting as both representatives of the state in their areas and representatives of the department in national legal and administrative matters. The prefects were to be responsible for the maintenance of general law and order, for political security, and for the supervision of government services. Finally, they were to implement decisions made by the departmental general councils.

In retrospect, the 1959 legislation seems to have been intended as enabling legislation: none of the prefects was appointed until October 1961, after the introduction of further reforms.[5] There was a clear concern with tightening central control during a delicate period in which French administrators would be withdrawn and their Ivoirien replacements would be few in number and limited in experience.

Some politicians were worried that this concern might lead to overcentralisation. Such fears surfaced in debate when the government rejected a proposal that the prefects should be under the control of the general councils. This refusal, plus the fact that the government had insisted on maintaining the *cercle* unit against the Assembly's commission's suggestion for decentralisation to the smaller *subdivisions*, provoked the more radical deputies. They complained (rightly) that the legislation simply made the administrative structure more complex, by adding a third intermediary level between the colonial government and the rural population. They also saw a threat to Africanisation in the law, evidently suspecting (rightly) that the old *commandants de cercle* would be kept on.[6] The Minister of the Interior replied quite firmly:

> "We have no intention of handing over administration of the departments and sub-prefectures to people other than those presently in charge. We all want Africanisation. It is the aim of the government, but . . . unfortun-

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[3] Each council had forty members, giving a total of 160 seats. Though the councils were later reduced in size and membership was honorific, they provided a useful source of patronage for the ruling party (the P.D.C.I.) at a time when there was great pressure by loyal but generally uneducated militants to get parliamentary places. See Aristide R. Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, Princeton 1964, p. 274.

[4] *Loi* 59-133 of 3rd September, 1959.

[5] Article six of the law stated that there would be no changes in the administration of the old *cercles* and *subdivisions* until full departmental administrations had been set up.

[6] *Journal Officiel de la Côte d'Ivoire. Débats de l'Assemblée Nationale*, 7th December, 1959, pp. 118, 119, 122, speeches of MM. Ekra, Amon Tanoh, and Anet Bilé. M. Ekra said:

"... unfortunately we have the impression that Africanisation, after a good start, has come to a complete halt . . . in the present situation (the élite) may be drawn to question the government's determination to Africanise". (p. 118) ately those returning from France . . . are drawn into politics when they come home."[7]

The issue of manpower was thus from the beginning a major theme in debate over local administration. Another theme was that of decolonisation and modernisation: the government and several deputies clearly regarded the adoption of the metropolitan prefectoral system as a significant step away from colonial status. Nobody commented on the irony of moving closer to the colonising culture so as to escape from colonial status. This irony was expressed well, if unconsciously, by one of the deputies:

> ". . . we should get rid of the redundant colonial structure. I hope that our new departments will be identical . . . to those of metropolitan France . . . I want to see the replacement of the colonialist titles like *cercles* and *subdivisions* by the titles of prefecture, sub-prefecture, and *arrondissements*."[8]

Personnel problems and training

To understand the government's dilemma, it is important to look at the state of the public service at independence. In 1960 the Ivory Coast had a civil service of nearly 21,000. Recurrent costs in the budget had quadrupled between 1950 and 1960: though administrative costs were well controlled thereafter by comparison to some other states, the civil service continued to expand, reaching 28,000 in 1968.[9] The administration consisted of nineteen ministries and 296 services and branches: its personnel was divided into 140 *corps*.

However, at independence there were only forty-five administrative secretaries in the entire service[10] In field administration, the first Africans were only appointed to junior posts (as assistants to *commandants de cercle*) in 1956. Four years later (after the reform discussed above) only one of the nineteen *commandants de cercle* (sub-prefects) was an Ivoirien and only half of the fifty *chefs de subdivison* were Ivoiriens.

Government policy in this situation was based on the premise that local government would continue to require generalist administrators. Although there was a lobby favouring the establishment of communes, the debate over post-colonial local government seems to have been limited to the question of devising an administrative hierarchy which would allow some deconcentration of powers while assuring firm political control. The latter requirement suggested that generalists might in fact be needed in greater numbers.

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[7] *Ibid*, p. 119, speech of M. Jean-Baptiste Mockey. The attraction of politics was hardly surprising. In August, 1957, M. Mockey and his colleagues had secured, in a closed session of the Territorial Assembly, salaries of £3,280 each – with the deputies' salaries, "the highest salary scale in all of French West Africa". Details of the salaries were never published. (Zolberg, *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*, pp. 192–3).

[8] *Ibid*, p. 118.

[9] Figures from: I.D.E.T.-C.E.G.O.S., *Etude de Plantification Administrative pour la République de Côte d'Ivoire, Novembre* 1962-*Novembre* 1963, vol. 1; *Journal Officiel de la République de Côte d'Ivoire* (hereafter referred to as J.O.R.C.I.), 10th December, 1960, p. 1509; *J.O.R.C.I.*, 16th January, 1968, p. 69. Establishment figures are given and exclude state-owned utilities. The total population of the Ivory Coast in 1968 was around 4,300,000.

[10] Only thirty-four of whom had received administrative training at the federal Ecole William Ponty in Dakar (*J.O.R.C.I.*, 10th December, 1960, pp. 1427–37). The root of this problem was the educational system: in 1947 the rate of school attendance in the territory was only 3.7 per cent: by the end of 1961 the rate was still under thirty-seven per cent.

With the situation thus defined, a demand for training programmes appeared from 1957 onwards. In 1958 the minister responsible for the civil service (the *Ministre de la Fonction Publique*) tried to get support for a national school of administration written into the four-year plan for 1958-62. He argued that such an institution should be concerned with the training of middle-level cadres since in the early years of independence the most acute shortage would be felt at this level, Meanwhile, the metropolitan training schools would be able to cope with the need for higher-level training, which would be taken up by the local school when the University of Abidjan was able to provide support.[11]

The minister's project was turned down by the Legislative Assembly on the grounds that a more ambitious institution was required. The government evaded this demand by proposing a temporary training programme (the establishment of which did not require full parliamentary debate).[12] A *Centre de Perfectionnement de la Fonction Publique* (C.P.F.P.) was created in March 1959 and the first trainees in the programme graduated in February 1960 after an eight month's course.[13] All thirty-nine trainees were from clerical grades ("cadre C" of the civil service), most having served for around ten years at this level. Altogether eighty-eight trainees went through the C.P.F.P. crash courses: of these, forty-two were posted to the Ministry of the Interior – set against recruitment, a net numerical gain for that ministry. Nearly all were promoted to the grade of administrative secretary (a grade in "cadre B", the executive class) and they provided the resources of middle-level generalists needed to Africanise local administration.

Until 1962 training for the administration class ("cadre A") was undertaken solely by the metropolitan administrative schools, notably the *Institut des Hautes Etudes d'Outre-Mer* (I.H.E.O.M.). Between 1960 and 1963, fifty-seven Ivoiriens graduated with the rank of civil administrator from the I.H.E.O.M.: thirty-eight of them were posted to the Ministry of the Interior. In 1960 the Ivoirien government decided to go ahead with the project of establishing a National School of Administration (the E.N.A.).[14] The E.N.A. was divided into two streams: "cycle A" which would take over the training of administrative class officials and "cycle B" which would continue the training of middle-level cadres started by the C.P.F.P.[15] "Cycle A" students were to take three years over their course, concluding with several months in Paris; "cycle B" students were to take two years. Each stream included both generalists and specialists.

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[11] Memorandum of *Ministre de la Fonction Publique*, January 1959; letter of *Ministre de la Fonction Publique*, to director of *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*, Paris, February 1959. The proposal for a school was first mooted in September 1957.

[12] Letter of Prime Minister to President of Constituent Assembly, 27th February 1959.

[13] The C.P.F.P. was set up by *arrêté no. 839/FP/CG* of 9th March 1959. Apart from courses on administrative and judicial organisation, the programme included courses on "general culture" and "major political, economic, social and literary questions".

[14] Formalised in the *loi* 60-271 of 2nd September 1960. It was put under the charge of the *Ministere de la Fonction Publique* and was run by a director and an administrative council. All three directors so far and all the staff have been French.

By the end of 1965, over 190 students had passed through "cycle B" courses and the first batch of nineteen had graduated from "cycle A". In this period only twenty-five of the middle-level trainees were sent to the Ministry of the Interior and only six of the "cycle A" graduates were posted there. In 1966 the E.N.A. was reorganised so as to provide training for promotion within the administrative class while continuing the courses for promotion from executive to administrative and clerical to executive classes.[16]

The Ivory Coast thus undertook a fairly substantial training programme in the first five years of independence. Over 280 clerical class officers were elevated by training to executive grades and seventy-six new members of the administrative class were trained. In 1960 and 1961 the priority in training was to produce generalists who would take over district administration: not only were half the trainees posted to the Ministry of the Interior, but that ministry took nearly all the more successful trainees.

However, the training provided was shorter than that available in later years. Also, while this training enabled the government to reduce steadily the number of French technical assistants in the Ministry, there was great fluidity throughout the early sixties, with civil servants moving from course to post and then back again for higher training. The overall establishment remained around the same level from 1960 to 1968, Ivoirien personnel moving (with or without training) into the executive and lower grades of the administrative classes as French personnel withdrew at the top.

Table 1. Training and the Ministry of the Inerior

Year of graduation	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965
Course	CPFP 1	CPFP 2	ENA 'B'	ENA 'B'	ENA 'B'	ENA 'B'
(Total No. of Trainees) ..	39	49	49	49	39	57
Posted to Ministry of Interior	14	28	8	7	16	4
Course	IHEOM	IHEOM	IHEOM	IHEOM	IHEOM	ENA 'A'
(Total No. of Trainees) ..	4	21	8	24	—	19
Posted to Ministry of Interior	3	12	6	17	—	16

Sources: J.O.R.C.I., 1960–65: archives of *Ecole Nationale d'Administration*, Abidjan

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[15] The first stream was to be recruited from civil servants in the executive class and probationers by direct entry: the latter had to have a *baccalauréat* or equivalent qualification. The second stream was to be recruited from civil servants in the clerical class and probationers by direct entry, in this case holding at least a higher primary certificate. There was an age-limit of thirty on direct entry candidates and one of forty-five on internal candidates. (*Décret no.* 61-5 of 3rd January 1961).

[16] *Décret no.* 66-443 of 21st September 1966. The old "cycle B" was relabelled "*Ecole Pratique de la Fonction Publique*".

Table 2. Ministry of the Interior. Higher establishment, 1960–68*

Establishment in:

Category	1960	1962	1963	1964	1966	1968
Technical assistance ..	109	67	61	60	42	41
"Cadre A" (administrative)	35	25	22	25	30	41
"Cadre A/B" (lower administrative and executive) ..	110	110	111	135	173	179
Total	254	202	194	220	245	261

* The total establishment of the Ministry grew over this period from 2,625 to 3,805; its share of total manpower in the civil service dropped from fourteen per cent to 13.2 per cent.

Sources: J.O.R.C.I., 24/12/1960; 23/2/1962; 6/2/1963; 4/3/1964; 14/11/1966; 15/1/1968.

Prefects and sub-prefects

By the middle of 1961 it was felt that a sufficient corps of trained personnel had been gathered for the new system of local administration to be launched. Fourteen of the trainess from the first C.P.F.P. course had been in field posts since February 1960: another twenty-eight had been posted to the Ministry of the Interior in February 1961.

The government brought in two laws defining the structure of local administration. The first abolished finally the units of *cercles* and *subdivisions*. Instead 104 sub-prefectures were created, usually by the amalgamation of two or more cantons.[17] The sub-prefectures varied greatly in area and population: in respect of the latter, the smallest had a population of 5,000, the largest one of 96,000. The average area of the sub-prefecture was naturally smaller than that of the *subdivision* (950 square miles as against 2,238 square miles); so too with population (an average of 28,763 as against 58,485). The subprefectures were divided into three classes according to size, level of development, and administrative infrastructure. Districts centred on an ex-*subdivision* or *cercle* headquarters became first-class sub-prefectures: those with no administrative infrastructure normally were put in the third class.

The departments continued as the larger units, with a different number of sub-prefectures in each.[18] The structure of departmental administration was defined by a second law (the *loi* 61-84 of April 10th, 1961). While this text remains the basis of local government in the Ivory Coast, it presents a major anomaly in that seventy-nine of the 117 articles provide in great detail for the operations of an institution, the departmental general council, which has never operated.

However, these provisions do throw some light on the government's thinking about local government and a good deal on its imitative spirit. In theory, the general council controls a departmental budget, drawn up by the prefect and funded by revenue from central government and from taxes levied in the department.[19] The council is also supposed to vet tenders, scholarships, communal development projects, and proposals to grant concessions: it must be consulted on changes affecting boundaries within the department.[20] The prefect is to have the right of entry to meetings of the council, including those of its permanent commission; he is to report on the running of the department and to supervise the execution of the budget.[21] While his subordinates could be required to furnish the council with information, the prefect controls all government services and he alone can sanction officials of these services.

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[17] *Loi* 61-4 of 2nd January 1961.

[18] In the north, twenty-four sub-prefectures; in the south-west, twenty-three; in the centre, twenty-eight; in the south-east, twenty-nine.

The hierarchy of local administration, 1961 to date


Level:
National
Minister of the Interior
Department
Prefect
Departmental General Council
Chef de cabinet
Secretary-General
Prefecture
Sub-Prefecture
Sub-Prefect
Sub-Prefecture Council (ex-Council of Notables)
Rural Development Committee
Canton Chief
Village Chief

In most respects, this structure is a replica of the metropolitan system. Potentially the general council (and especially its permanent commission) is a powerful check on the prefect. Its independence is limited by a provision that the budget must be approved by the Ministers of the Interior and Finance: there is also a curious provision that,

> "all political resolutions are strictly forbidden."[22]

However, in reality the prefect alone rules: there have been occasional meetings of the members of the councils but none of the formal structure has yet been realised and there are no departmental budgets.[23]

While this leaves the prefect with considerable autonomy, his position is weakened by the lack of a budget and elective representation. He has a wide formal competence, representing (as before) the state in the department and the department in national legal and governmental affairs and supervising the ministerial branches, his own sub-prefects, and any semi-autonomous communes in his area.[24] The chiefs come under his authority. In general, he,

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[19] *Loi* 61-84, articles 52, 53.

[20] *Loi* 61-84, articles 57, 58, 59.

[21] *Loi* 61-84, articles 26, 49, 70, 72, 95. There is provision for a commission of between five and seven members elected annually and meeting each month when the council is out of session. The commission is empowered to decide onpriorities in the implementation of projects and to get all information it may need from civil servants. The prefect is required to give account each month of the state of departmental finances to the commission.

[22] *Loi* 61-84, articles 61, 64. The council is thus seen as an "administrative" body.

[23] The *de facto* abandonment of the councils is officially ascribed to the lack of adequate resources for departmental budgets.

> "represents national interests . . . supervises the enforcement of law and government decisions . . . is responsible for taking all measures to protect the security of the state, the security of individuals, public peace and order.[25]

The prefect is assisted by a secretary-general who automatically takes over in the prefect's absence: both men are appointed by presidential decree on the nomination of the Minister of the Interior.[26]

The sub-prefects are the equivalents of the prefects in the districts. They, too, are appointed by decree: they act by delegation from the prefects whom they represent. The sub-prefect is responsible for government services in his district and co-ordinates development programmes.[27] Village chiefs are appointed, subject to the sub-prefect's approval, by the prefect and both village and canton chiefs come under the sub-prefect's supervision. In the Councils of Notables the sub-prefect has taken the place of the *chef de subdivision*, nominating members, drawing up the agenda, presiding over meetings, and presenting estimates for the use of taxes collected locally as well as of subventions from central government.[28] The sub-prefect acts as a civil registrar and conducts censuses.[29] Finally, he has an overall responsibility for the maintenance of law and order and for keeping the government informed of the political situation in his district.[30]

The system at work, 1961-1969

The 1961 legislation created a structure which was formally almost identical to that of the prefectoral system in France. (Indeed, the legislation was based on a report by a metropolitan prefect.) The official reason for adopting this structure was that it would bring the administration closer to the people.[31] Certainly the multiplication of administrative posts did make for shorter journeys and easier access by the people: certainly also it extended political control deeper into the districts and villages.

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[24] *Loi* 61-84, articles 80, 84.

[25] *Ibid*, articles 84, 90.

[26] *Ibid*, articles 80, 81. The prefect also has a *chef de cabinet* as a personal and political aide, but it is the secretary-general who controls the two administrative sections of the prefecture (the Division of Administrative and General Affairs and the Division of Economic, Financial and Social Affairs). *Décret no*. 62-175 of 29th May 1962).

[27] *Ibid*, articles 98, 100, 101. Officials of the ministries of Finance and Justice are exempt from prefectoral control.

[28] *Ibid*, articles 99, 102.

[29] *Ibid*, article 105.

[30] *Ibid*, article 104. The sub-prefect is responsible for keeping electoral registers up to date and for supervising arrangements for elections. The political duties of the sub-prefect are defined at length in a handbook written by a French technical adviser:

> "Prevention is better than repression. This is a question of intelligence, that is of continuous details designed to keep the government informed and to enable it to take appropriate measures. It is important therefore that the sub-prefect should know exactly what is happening in his district: the attitudes and morale of the populace, their opinions, movements under way, subversive behaviour, suspicious activity, and other influences."

(Robert Guidon Lavallée, *Le Manuel du Sous-Préfet*, Abidjan, n.d., p. 83). This book stresses the duty of defending state security against internal and external threats and gives an accurate picture of the wide range of sub-prefectoral powers.

But there have been problems, criticisms, and modifications since the system was introduced. One criticism has been that of cost. By 1966 six prefects and 110 sub-prefects were being employed to run local government for a rural population of only 3,100,000.[32] Between 1961 and 1967, the Ministry of the Interior's share of the recurrent budget rose from 5.7 per cent to 7.4 per cent – over twice the share of the Ministry of Agriculture. The building of new offices and residences cost £1,277,000 during the period 1962–1966: in 1965 alone, £294,000 were spent on providing infrastructure for third-class sub-prefectures, previously administered from other districts for lack of equipment.[33] In 1968 over thirteen per cent of civil service manpower was employed in the Ministry of the Interior.

Despite the training programme (and in part because of its continuation), the new system suffered from chronic shortages of staff. The authors of a survey carried out by a French organization in 1963 found that only eighty-six of (by then) 108 sub-prefectures actually had incumbents and that thirty-five of sixty established posts in the prefectures were vacant as were over 100 of 250 junior posts. In the Ministry as a whole, only thirty-nine of the 131 established "cateogry A" posts were filled by qualified personnel.[34] Because the system was lavish and centralised there was a "superabundance of personnel" in Abidjan. The report continued:

> "Prefectures and sub-prefectures are sometimes deserted . . . 'Under-administration' is common: too few prefects, and sub-prefects with inadequate training."[35]

The problem of quality worried the Ministry. Many young civil servants were promoted into field posts where, because of the other deficiencies in the structure, they were not checked as closely as was desirable.[36] In 1964 two sub-prefects were suspended, one having burnt down a village in his zeal for modernisation: a third was jailed for embezzlement.[37] In 1965 an eastern sub-prefect wnt to jail and in 1966 two more sub-prefects were suspended.[38] The prefectoral corps was also very liable to intrigue because of its strategic place in the political system. The prefect of the south-eastern department and two sub-prefects in mid-western districts were imprisoned in 1963 for their alleged involvement in a plot against Houphouet.[39]

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[31] Actually, to "*les administrés*".

[32] The salary scale for administrative secretaries (the lower grade for sub-prefects) runs from £948 to £2,502; that for civil administrators (most of the prefects and senior sub-prefects) runs from £1,224 to £3,448. (Figures from *décrets* nos. 65-17 and 65-18 of 14th January 1965: converted at pre-devaluation rates). In 1961 personnel charges for field administration made up forty-four per cent of the Ministry of the Interior's budget; in 1968 they took up twenty-seven per cent (*J.O.R.C.I.*, 24th December 1960, p. 1505; 16th January 1968, pp. 68, 71).

[33] Figures from *J.O.R.C.I.*, 3rd April 1962, p. 372; 17th July 1963, pp. 844-5; 20th March 1964, p. 417; 4th May 1965, p. 493; 17th June 1966, p. 781; and private communication.

[34] I.D.E.T.-C.E.G.O.S., *Etude de Planification* . . ., part II, vol. 5, p. 81. The authors criticised the expansion of higher level posts and also the academic rigidities of the inherited French system, whereby a P.T. instructor had to possess a *baccalauréat*. A glance at exam curricula reveals similar oddities: for example, a paper in moral philosophy is required of candidates for the forest ranger service.

[35] *Ibid*, vol. 1, p. 2; part II, vol. 5, p. 89.

[36] In the second C.P.F.P. course the average age was thirty-one.

[37] *J.O.R.C.I.*, 27th August 1964, p. 1184; 29th October 1964, p. 1491.

One effect of introducing the metropolitan structure in a situation of scarcity was heavy dependence on French personnel at key points in the administration. From late 1959 onward, a number of colonial administrators were withdrawn from field posts into central government services. After October 1961 all the prefects and sub-prefects were Ivoirien and during the subsequent period the number of technical assistance personnel in the Interior ministry decreased.[40] But in such a centralised system their influence was inevitably very great through their presence in Abidjan and in the departmental prefectures. In 1966 the Minister's *directeur de cabinet* was an ex-*commandant de cercle*; there were two French technical councillors attached to the *cabinet*; and the directors of the field administration and financial sections were both French.[41] All the secretary-generals appointed to the prefectures were ex-colonial administrators: it was only in 1967 that an Ivoirien was appointed to one of these posts.[42] In 1961 the government dispatched four "government delegates" to the prefectures: all were ex-*commandants de cercle*.[43]

A further medium of expatriate control was provided by the Inspectorate of Administrative Affairs, set up in 1961 and attached to the Ministry of the Interior. The inspectors were mainly responsible for checking on the running of the sub-prefectures.[44] Until 1964 eight of the nine inspectors were expatriates.[45] Thus, despite earlier statements to the effect that "technical and administrative assistance is . . . a transitory phenomenon"[46], the French presence has bcome a constant. Indeed, between 1960 and 1968 the total number of technical assistance personnel in the country rose from 1,487 to 1,988.[47]

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[38] *J.O.R.C.I.*, 13th May 1965, p. 545 and 30th September 1965, p. 1045; 27th January 1966, pp. 84, 106. Nearly all officials so involved were serving in outlying posts.

J.O.R.C.I., 20th June 1963, pp. 743, 744.

[40] The first prefects were appointed on 6th October 1961: reshuffles occurred in 1963 and 1964 but since then there has been no prefectoral movement. Of the nine men who have held these posts, at least six were trained at the I.H.E.O.M.; three were closely identified with the P.D.C.I. (including two of those without Paris training). The old party men were given the border departments: the most sensitive, that of the west, went to an ex-official of the inter-territorial R.D.A., Fily Sissoko. There is also a core of political "trusties" among the sub-prefects. But while there was a political element in the appointments, all those appointed were administrators of some seniority: the prefect of the central department (the most heavily populated and that from which Houphouet's securest following comes) has long been a man who was an active opponent of the P.D.C.I. in 1947-51. The 1961 law does not require that those appointed to field posts should be civil servants, (*loi* 61-84, article 108).

[41] Appointments given or noted in *J.O.R.C.I.*, 13th February 1960, p. 199, and 23rd June 1966, p. 796. In 1964 and 1965 four French technical advisers were appointed to the *Sureté*, two of them to the special branch (*J.O.R.C.I.*, 24th September 1964, p. 1312; 28th October, 1965, p. 1147).

[42] *Décret no.* 61-398 of 1st December 1961; *J.O.R.C.I.*, 31st October 1963, p. 1226; 9th January 1964, p. 42; 13th February 1964, p. 210; *décret no.* 67-454 of October 30th 1967.

[43] *Décrets nos.* 61-319 of 6th October 1961 and 61-335 of 24th October 1961. The duties of these officials were never defined: they seem now to have faded away.

[44] *Décret no.* 61-104 of 12th April 1961.

[45] *J.O.R.C.I.*, 30th April 1964, p. 557; 13th August 1964, p. 1017; 10th September 1964, p. 1237; 29th October 1964, p. 1471.

Problems emerged in the working of the new structure. One problem concerned the role of the prefect in co-ordination. His powers were insufficiently defined and the technical ministries were reluctant to delegate specified functions to him in their own fields. Further, the regional organisation of the ministries often did not coincide with departmental boundaries and some of the services lacked field officers. Despite circulars from Abidjan, field officers commonly failed to report on their activities to the prefects. There was no budget around which the prefect could organise co-ordination and impose control. In short, his role lacked both definition and sanctions. Frequently, as one official remarked, the prefect became "no more than a letter-box", passing on communications from his subordinates and transmitting government intructions to them.[48]

The size of departments was felt to be one cause of the prefects' weaknesses and the number of departments was therefore increased – to six in 1963 and to twelve in 1969 (with a provision that the number will eventually be raised to twenty-four)[49]. According to one school of thought, this means that the government has recognised its error in imposing an unadapted French system and is quietly returning to the old organisation of *cercles* (viz., twenty-four instead of nineteen). However, this may be, the large number of sub-prefectures remains and the departmental reforms will make for an even denser and more costly local administration.

Sub-prefects, party men, and chiefs

At district level, the sub-prefects have experienced problems similar to those of their superiors. Lacking direct budgetary or disciplinary powers, they too have often been by-passed by officials of the technical services. Their failure as co-ordinators has been accopanied by the demise of Rural Development Committees set up in 1962 on Houphouet's orders.[50] Many sub-prefects are over-worked and lack competent assistants.[51]

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[46] Mathieu Ekra, "L'organisation de la fonction publique en Côte d' Ivoire", Penant (Paris), no. 659, p. 663.

[47] *J.O.R.C.I.*, 24th December 1960, p. 1509, and 16th January 1968, p. 69. These figures represent only those in the "technical assistance" cadre: because of the existence of temporary and contracted personnel, the actual figure is considerably higher. Thus in 1963 there were 1,272 French nationals occupying "cadre A" posts (the total of such posts being 1,790) and 1,065 "cadre B" posts – 2,337 altogether, as against an establishment figure of 1,562 for "technical assistance" (I.D.E.T.-C.E.G.O.S., *Etude de planification* . . ., vol. 1, p. 1; *J.O.R.C.I.*, 6th February 1963, p. 121). In 1964 the "technical assistance" figure was 1,332: 635 posts were held in "cadre A", 651 in "cadre B", and 46 in "cadre C" (Bureau de liaison des agents de coopération technique, *Coopération et développement*, nos. 3-4, October-December 1964, p. 9).

[48] Personal communication. A *loi-plan* of 1967 provided for the creation of departmental development commissions, which might create a basis for prefectoral co-ordination, if accompanied by some financial decentralisation.

[49] By *loi* 63-454 of 11th November 1963 prefectures were created at Abengourou in the east and Man in the west (the four existing since 1959 were at Abidjan, Daloa in the mid-west, Bouaké in the centre, and Korhogo in the north). By a law of 6th June 1969 additional prefectures were created at Odienné and Bondoukou in the north, Gagnoa in the mid-west, Dimbokro in the centre and Sassandra and Aboisso in the south. Gagnoa and Aboisso are known in the Ivory Coast as centres of opposition to the regime; Bondoukou and Odienné invariably recorded high opposition votes before independence.

Looked at sociologically, the position of the sub-prefect is delicate and insecure. Typically a stranger to his district, he lacks a political base and political support, apart from that accruing to him as representative of the government. The training process, while it embodies a "human relations" approach, tends to create an *esprit de corps* among general administrators and to emphasize their primary loyalty to the state. The ambiance of training is conveyed by some remarks made at the graduation ceremony of the first C.P.F.P. course. On this occasion the Minister of the Civil Service told the trainees:

> "As assistants to the *commandants de cercle* and as to *chefs de subdivision*, you will be dealing with backward people. You will strive to solve their various problems with boldness but also with tact. You will have to be at once their chief, their teacher, and their friend."[52]

In most districts, however, the people already have a variety of chiefs, a multitude of teachers, and even a few friends. The sub-prefects frequently run up against the entrenched power of the local political bosses, specifically the district P.D.C.I. general secretaries. Against such opposition and against popular mistrust or reluctance, the sense of authority born of training may make frustrations all the more painful and intolerable. The probability of such frustration is maximised when an official is carefully trained to respect the opinion of his professional colleagues and superiors and is then put in a highly vulnerable, fragile, and dependent situation where the obstacles to advancing his professional reputation are so great. In this context, it is not surprising if market-places are occasionally burnt down, village chiefs abused, and litigious old men locked up.

The uncertainties experienced by the sub-prefect are the consequence of a policy which quite deliberately plays off local adminstrators against local politicians. The party leadership has taken some trouble to smooth relations between sub-prefects and general secretaries, declaring that their roles are distinct and complementary.[53] But it is quite clear that some conflict at district level is regarded, unofficially, as useful and desirable, at least in moderation: in this view, the administrator and the party man should keep an eye on each other. There is an informal convention in the relevant quarters that a sub-prefect who appears to be in complete harmony with the local general secretary is automatically eligible for an early posting. This policy is intended to stop speculation and political intrigue. But a sub-prefect who gets into serious conflict with the party is equally likely to be removed, at the instance of the party. In short, there is a structured tension between the two officials, neither having a role which is substantially distinct from the other's: there is a large and hazy area of common concern.

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[50] Prescribed by circular no. 1214/AGRI/BE of 2nd April 1962.

[51] I.D.E.T.-C.E.G.O.S., *Etude de plantification . . .*, vol. 5, p. 89.

[52] Speech of M. Ernest Boka, reported in *Fraternité* (Abidjan), 12th February 1960, p. 9.

[53] At the 1965 P.D.C.I. congress, the secretary-general of the party, M. Philippe Yacé, dwelt at length on relations between general-secretaries and sub-prefects:

"In the modern state, there is administration on one side, politics on the other. This is a matter of two entities which are quite distinct even though they should work together . . . The sub-prefect in his district is in command, he directs: the general secretary in the same district has a role of persuasion: he and the sub-prefect should work in tandem . . . they complement each other; the general secretary should, with the means of which he alone disposes, namely the platform, personal contact, in short persuasion, induce the militants to carry out the work required . . . instead of which you (the general secretaries) indulge in polemics which are both negative and ineffectual".

(Ministère de l'Information, *IVe Congrès P.D.C.I.-R.D.A.*, 23-24-25 *Septembre* 1965, pp. 40-1).

The main effect of post-colonial reform on the chieftaincy has been a downgrading of the canton chiefs. With the creation of smaller district units, it is held that the administrator can communicate directly with the village chiefs, with the result that the canton chiefs are redundant as intermediaries. There has been no systematic removal of canton chiefs and they still get their salaries. But vacancies are left unfilled and in this way the institution will eventually die out. In 1966 the position was as follows:

Table 3. Canton chieftaincy, Ivory Coast, 1966

Departments	South	North	Centre	East	Mid-West	West	Total
Canton chiefs in office	47	41	43	20	25	32	208
Canton chiefs suspended	4	—	—	—	1	—	5
Chieftaincies vacant	14	10	17	3	7	7	58
	65	51	60	23	33	39	271

Source: Ministère de l'Intérieur, Direction de l'Administration Générale, *Situation des Cantons de Côte d'Ivoire*, 1966.

But in every other respect the situation is exactly as under the colonial regime: the chieftaincy ordinance of 1934 is still in force. The prefect has taken over from the *commandant de cercle* the formal appointment of village chiefs (nominated by elders or democratically in their own villages).[54]

Similarly, there is still no representative institution at district level. The only change that has taken is the transformation of the Councils of Notables into Sub-prefecture Councils.[55] Under this reform, deputies and members of the general councils are debarred from membership of the district councils: previously they had been virtually *ex officio* members. The 1967 decree also provided that nobody could be a member of more than one council.[56] Otherwise, the procedures for appointment and the conduct of business were to be as before, leaving all control in the hands of the sub-prefect.[57] The motive for this overhaul of district councils seems to have been the Minister of the Interior's wish to stop "politicians meddling in administrative matters"[58] The decree included a provision not in the 1919 ordinance and modelled on that concerning the general councils:

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[54] The *impôt* was abolished in 1960 so the village chiefs no longer get a rebate from tax collections. Instead, they are often allocated a small share of the proceeds from the sale of P.D.C.I. cards in their villages. In this respect, a sanction over the chiefs has been transferred from the administration to the party: it is difficult to say how powerful a sanction it is. There are much weightier sanctions that both sides can bring to bear.

[55] *Décret no.* 67-233 of 2nd June 1967.

[56] Previously there had been a good deal of pluralism. One deputy in the central department was a member of three Councils of Notables, his unofficial "fief" covering those districts. The 1967 decree also limited non-residential members to a quarter of the places: this was presumably aimed at unofficial patrons outside the elected assemblies.

> "All political discussions are strictly forbidden."

Conclusions

Writing in this journal on local government in Zambia, Professor Tordoff remarked that,

> ". . . there has never been any real attempt to re-examine critically the machinery of government *as a whole*, as a means of gearing that machinery to large-scale economic and social change."[59]

The same judgement applies to the Ivory Coast. Two factors shaped the moulding of post-colonial local administration. One was the inheritance of colonial institutions and of colonial personnel, whose influence was considerable in the Ministry of the Interior and the training institutions during the crucial period of transition. The second factor was the inheritance regime's uncritical belief that adoption of the metropolitan prefectoral system was a significant and sufficient move towards "modernisation", that imposition of this framework symbolised and entailed "modernity".

The interplay of these two factors produced a structure with high costs in training, personnel charges, and infrastructural investment, a structure which combined the cumbrous centralisation of the French system with the autocracy of the colonial system. In truth, it has involved neither the element of decentralisation nor that of democracy officially claimed for it. Instead, it has provided a rather lavish network of political control and a renewed lease of life for the corps of generalist administrators. Given the dilapidated and atrophied condition of the political party and other non-official bodies, the new structure has become a vehicle for the bureaucratisation of central-local relations and of local political life.

In present conditions the local government systems of developing countries have to justify themselves as agencies of development, in addition to the purposes of "control" and "integration" which they serve for central government and the political elite. As Paul Mercier has written,

> "The task of administrators in developing countries is one of generating change more than one of ensuring control."[60]

It is reasonably clear that the Ivory Coast's local government system carries out the second function well enough: how far it is also capable of stimulating social and economic change remains rather obscure.

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[57] The only step towards strengthening the institution was a requirement that the council must meet once every six months. The sub-prefect continued as president, nominating the members (between eight and sixteen), who were then to be appointed by the prefect (for three years). The representatives of government services were to be *ex officio* members.

[58] In fact there had been proposals to create elected councils but these were rejected (this was a distinct campaign from that for rural communes).

[59] "Provincial and District Government in Zambia, part I", Journal of Administration Overseas, vol. III, no. 3 (July 1968), pp. 432-3.

[60] Paul Mercier, "Facteurs sociologiques de la vie administrative en Afrique", Bulletin de l'Institut des Hautes Etudes d'Outre-Mer (Paris), no. 1, January 1966.

A Note on the History and Functions of Local Government in Botswana

By J. E. S. GRIFFITHS

Mr. Griffiths who formerly served in the Tanganyikan Administration, recently completed an assignment in Botswana concerned particularly with the training of local and central government administrative personnel.

In 1885 there were two Bechuanalands, British Bechuanaland south of the Molopo River, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate north of the river which was under the protection of the Queen and which eventually became the independent Botswana of to-day.

The capital of the two territories was Vryburg, but this was moved north to Mafeking in 1896 in order to enable closer control of the administration of the Protectorate to be maintained when British Bechuanaland was incorporated in 1895 into the Cape Colony. Mafeking continued as the capital until it was moved to Gaborone when Botswana attained independence in 1966.

The British Government was somewhat reluctant to assume the protection of Bechuanaland but international events in Southern Africa at the time forced their hand. The situation again became tense ten years later when the Government made a move to incorporate the country into the administration of Rhodes' British South Africa Company.

Several of the leading chiefs immediately took issue on the matter and petitioned the Secretary of State and three of their number, Khama of the Ngwato, Bathoen of the Ngwaketse and Sebele of the Kwena eventually went in person to England to protest about the proposal and to ask that the Queen's protection should continue.

After some negotiation the request was agreed to and at the same time several decisions were made which vitally affected the future of the country.

These included, apart from the surrendering of a strip of land for the north-south railway, decisions as to the boundaries of the different tribes, the legal jurisdiction of the chiefs, and the payment of an annual government tax which was however to be collected by the chiefs and not by government officials.

To begin with there was the minimum of interference by the British with the local administration of the country. The chiefs were allowed maximum internal independence and were expected to maintain law and order. They held courts of justice as they always had done and administered local law and custom. There were additionally magistrates appointed by the central government who had jurisdiction over non-Africans and also in cases involving Africans from differing tribal areas.

This was the first recognizable sign of the division between the functions of central government and those of local government.

Although in the early days of the Protectorate there was the maximum regard for the customary authority of the chiefs and a very great deal was left to them, the complications of government gradually enforced greater participation by the protecting power in the affairs of the country, particularly as the British officers in charge felt an ever increasing sense of responsibility towards the protected tribes. We find them settling boundary disputes, dealing with incidents involving neighbouring governments, or incursions of the Boers, and helping with negotiations concerning land and mineral concessions.

Not only did these involvements of the British modify the position of the chiefs and the then local administration but there were also other internal factors which had the same effect. Among these was the slow but steady development of the cash economy among a population numbering only 125,000 in 1911.

On the social and political side the activities of the missions and, among the Ngwato, the introduction of Khama's Law, as it was called, had a noticeable effect. The Law for instance changed such matters as the local custom on the payment of bride wealth and the law of inheritance.

Local authorities and administration gradually changed and developed. In 1920 a Native Advisory Council was appointed to discuss "native interests". This Council consisted of chiefs and lay members who were in theory appointed by the tribe in *Kgotla* (open tribal assembly) although in effect this meant appointment by the chiefs. The Council provided a very useful link between the administration and the people in the tribal areas. (This Native Advisory Council lasted for many years and gradually assumed more importance and became the African Advisory Council in 1951 and the African Council in 1964 when it was composed of the Resident Commissioner seven official members and members from the eight independent tribes).

In 1933 Sir Alan Pim reported on the financial and economic position of the Protectorate and in the course of his report made various suggestions about the "native administration" of the country. He found that the principles which were laid down in 1895 concerning the administration and jurisdiction of the chiefs had been upheld and maintained. There was however he said no definition of their powers and there was an absence of what he described as "harmonization of administrative procedure" between the civil servants and the local authorities. The chiefs he said had achieved a practical autocracy.

He was not happy however with their administration and described them as using the Government as a shield behind which to exceed their powers.

There were for instance incidents in which the Masarwa were unfairly dealt with by the Ngwato, there were cases of illegal accumulation of monies received from courts, etc., and cases where the courts were misused. Sir Alan Pim suggested that as some reform was patently necessary there should be a formal change to "indirect rule" under which, as far as possible, native institutions of government would be maintained in their original form while at the same time bringing them into conformity with modern requirements. It also aimed at training the local authorities in executive responsibilities and government procedures. It was hoped thereby to extend their sphere of administration. The system at the same time defined the powers of the chiefs and tribal organizations and restricted their functions where considered necessary.

In 1926 Tshekedi Khama became Regent of the Ngwato during the minority of Seretse the putative chief. Tshekedi was a strong character and both he and Bathoen of the Ngwaketse, also a strong character and jealous of his position, opposed very strongly Sir Alan Pim's views on curbing Chiefly powers.

The position of the chiefs looked at from this distance in time was no easy one. The central government regarded them as their agents and also as local authorities who provided services for their people. At the same time government wished and indeed needed to control them so that they would not have unfettered power in their areas. This naturally affected their position with their own people and they had to chart a difficult course between government and tribal pressures.

The government at about this time in common with administrations in other countries under protection or mandate, awakened to the necessity for regularising, improving and systematizing local government, and during the 1930's several Proclamations were issued by the High Commissioner which materially affected the chiefs and so, the local authorities.

This marked the beginning of an active interest in local government, and inevitably the years immediately following were fraught with arguments, discussions and indeed opposition particularly from Tshekedi and Bathoen.

The Native Authority Proclamation, 1934, was the first to be issued and this recognized the chief and his functions and also the necessity for appointing a Tribal Council. There had of course always been assistant chiefs and headman who advised the chiefs but there was never any formal body. In fact in this respect the chiefs in Bechuanaland were rather different from chiefs in many other African countries who had much more definite advisory councils of their own.

Tshekedi objected strongly to the appointment of formal councils and appealed against the decision – eventually to the Privy Council. The chiefs as a whole contended that the Proclamation infringed their sovereignty and was contrary to local law and custom. The Privy Council decided that the government in the Protectorate did have the power to appoint such councils but that they were outside local law and custom – a decision that upheld the authority of the government and at the same time admitted one of the Chiefs' principal contentions!

The second proclamation was the Native Tribunal Proclamation of 1934. Under this proclamation Judicial Tribunals in the reserves were given a fixed composition and the *Kgotla* was replaced as a judicial body. The right of appeal from the Tribunals was also laid down.

This second proclamation was also opposed by the chiefs. The effect of both these Proclamations was that the chiefs were now obliged, as of law, to obey the instructions of the Resident Commissioner. The Secretary of State when appealed to on the matter ruled that His Majesty's Government had unfettered and unlimited power to legislate for the government and administration of justice among the tribes of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.

In these circumstances the atmosphere was far from conducive to the development of local government. However in 1936 a new Resident Commissioner was appointed and he, realising that Tshekedi was the key to the country's advancement, adopted a different approach from that of his predecessor and sought the Regent's advice and criticism on matters of reforms. The atmosphere lightened.

The Tribal Treasury Proclamation of 1938 was issued in due course and authorized the setting up of Tribal Treasuries. Chiefs were given a fixed stipend and 35 per cent of tax collected was paid into the Treasuries. Later, in 1940, Colonial Development and Welfare Funds were also available to the Treasuries. The chiefs then became responsible for education and agriculture through their new finance committees. Finally the Education Proclamation 1938 was published and this dealt with primary schools and education committees. Also, in 1940, amendments were made to the original 1934 Proclamation, again with the agreement of Tshekedi. Under the new regime he co-operated with the Resident Commissioner in re-organizing tribal administration in the country, and in 1943 another amendment was made which restored the *Kgotla* as the main consultative body and the Tribal Council practically dropped out of the picture. However wise or inadvisable this was, the effect of the amendments was to strengthen and consolidate local administration throughout the Protectorate.

During the second world war the chiefs responded generously to requests from government for help and this renewed reliance on them improved their morale which had fallen during the re-thinking of the pattern of local administration.

After the war the Secretary of State for the colonies called for the modernization of tribal administrations including the setting up of formal councils on a democratic basis. This was the prelude to the granting of responsible government on a national basis in the not too distant future. But while there was an active and speedy response to this call in many other parts of Africa, in Bechuanaland the progress was very slow and indeed the dispute in the Central (Ngwato) district between Seretse and Tshekedi during the period 1949–1952 caused considerable delay in all administrative development because a large proportion of the time of government was taken up in connection with it. For the diverse fortunes of the Ngwato internal administration always played an important part in developments generally in the Protectorate. The Ngwato area is the largest tribal area and now has a population of over 200,000, about a third of the total population of the whole country. Nevertheless in spite of the set-back caused by the Ngwato dispute the early Nineteen Fifties saw the first steps taken towards modernizing local administration.

Tshekedi who had been exiled during the Seretse dispute now pressed for tribal councils but it was not until he returned to the Nwgato district in 1953 that a Tribal Council was announced for the Ngwato. Four years later in 1957 the African Local Council Proclamation was published which authorized the setting up of Local Councils and an elected Executive Committee to assist chiefs. The Executive Committees consisted of members elected indirectly through the Kgotla and chiefs' nominees.

Reform of the old tribal system was slow and gradual – indeed until the early sixties there was little real change. Tribal administration remained as the personal rule by the chief who, although he studied the wishes of his people and consulted with them, made his own decisions in matters of administration. He was closely associated in this attitude with the central government which acted to a great extent through the District Commissioners.

In the early sixties however, the Tswana were beginning to become aware, at least in some degree, that prolonged rule by an authority, i.e. a chief, who was not constitutionally responsible to them was not likely to be acceptable for very much longer in modern democratic-oriented Africa. The wind of change was reaching Bechuanaland and the tribal administration was not measuring up to the needs and wishes of those who because they were better educated or relatively advanced in other ways, wanted modern services such as better roads, water supplies, etc.; the means of raising revenue locally were at the same time totally inadequate to provide adequate services even although many of the chiefs had made a praiseworthy effort to keep abreast of the times particularly in providing services for the community in the field of primary education. But this was not enough.

A Local Government Committee was accordingly set up in 1963 to make recommendations for improving the structure of local government. It had already been felt that the modernization of local government would mean the development of a system which did not depend for its success on personality and the office of the chief. This did not imply however that the chieftainship should be abolished: on the contrary it was felt that the chief, provided he was prepared to be adaptable could and should play an active and valuable part.

The Committee made recommendations as to the system which should be introduced. These included, briefly, the creation and setting up of District Councils with a majority of elected members (elected on the basis of universal adult suffrage) charged with the duty of providing certain services which were to be financed from local revenue obtained from a graduated local government tax.

Three main pieces of legislation were proposed as necessary to put the recommendations into effect. These were a Local Government (District Councils) Law, a Chieftainship Law and a Local Government Tax Law. A Local Government Advisory Board was set up in 1965 as a successor to the Local Government Committee and this consisted of six members nominated by the Legislative Assembly, two members nominated by the Minister and three members nominated by the House of Chiefs. The Board considered the proposals and eventually the Laws were drafted and passed after consideration by yet another body, the House of Chiefs. The appropriate Councils were then established.

Today there are nine units of rural local government in each of which a District Council was established by Order published in the Gazette, in April, 1966. In the Central, Kgatleng, Ngwaketse, North West and South East districts the Chief was at first the *ex officio* chairman of the council but since November 1969, all councils have had elected chairmen. Government has devolved certain defined powers on the Councils and these are set out in the schedule to the District Council Law No. 35/65. These functions are conferred by Legal Notices or Instruments under the Law. The provision of primary education is a mandatory function. Others which are permissive include services in respect of health and sanitation, public water supplies, the construction and maintenance of public roads, etc. Whether a council undertakes to provide a service or not depends among other things on the resources (financial and staff) available to it.

Councils have also been given other mandatory powers, e.g. under the Trading Act, whereby licensing is the responsibility of local authorities: the *Matimela* Act under which the council has certain responsibilities regarding stray cattle and the Forest Act where certain permissive powers are granted to local authorities to declare forest reserves.

Councils may make bye-laws for the area in which they have been established in respect of all functions which they undertake.

Primary education is by far and away the most urgent commitment of local authorities and the fact that this is a mandatory function is largely historical. Over 60 per cent of council revenue is spent on education – a very high proportion; and in many instances little is left for other services. Under the Education Law, District councils are appointed as Local Education Authorities.

District Councils vary very greatly in their general composition, wealth and geographical size, e.g. The Central District Council of the Ngwato deals with a population of over 200,000 and its jurisdiction covers an area of 56,000 square miles. There are 38 Council members some 300 employees (excluding teachers) and an expenditure of R700,000, while Ghanzi District Council with a population of 18,000 covers an area of 40,000 square miles, has twelve Council members, an expenditure of R46,000 and ten employees (excluding teachers).

Some councils are in a fortunate position and have funds, fairly adequate staff and a reasonable population/area ratio. Other councils are responsible for large, sparsely populated and undeveloped areas of the country, and they at present lack the resources for much needed expansion and even for the staff with which to carry out improvements. The services which many of the councils provide are still of a minimal standard.

The terms of the District Councils Law require local authorities to appoint a Secretary and a Treasurer but the same person may be appointed to both offices, e.g. The Secretary of the Kgalagadi District Council also doubles with the post of Treasurer. In addition the councils are empowered to appoint such other staff as they deem desirable. Appointment of all senior staff is subject to ministerial approval.

Finance is of course crucial to the operation of the local government system. The councils' main sources of revenue are derived from Local Government Tax, Trade Licences, School Fees, Game licences/Hunting fees, *Matimela* fees, etc. Revenue is of major concern to all councils but in the majority of cases an efficient collection system is not yet in operation. Were it so, council finances generally would be increased in many areas by between 30 and 50 per cent.

The Chieftainship Law, although not an inherent part of the Local government system, is of importance in view of the great part played by chiefs in the past, and also because of their continued influence today among the people of the districts. Furthermore the present system grew out of the old Tribal Administrations which operated under the chiefs.

The Law replaces the old African Administration Proclamation and provides for the appointment of chiefs and matters related thereto. It also sets out their powers. It certainly reduces their personal powers from what they were in the past but their residual powers as traditional authorities will continue (at least for some time) to be of significance. This is particularly the case where they have become chairmen of district councils, when they actually have a larger sphere of action than hitherto.

Chiefs, Headmen and Chiefs' Representatives are not employees of councils nor are they public officers. Although they are paid by government they are best described as "tribal employees". This applies to tribal police also. Chiefs and their subordinates are expected to co-operate and help in carrying out many administrative functions in conjunction with councils. They also preside in the local Customary Courts and it is in this field that perhaps their main strength lies. The Law provides that a number of administrative powers are exercised after consultation with the tribe in the customary manner and include such matters as carrying out tribal ceremonies, deciding on tribal membership, and maintaining law and order.

The change from the old tribal system to that of a modern democratic form of local government has taken place over a long period. Much progress has been made since the war and during the last seven years things have moved particularly fast – in the opinion of some perhaps a little too fast in view of the limited resources of trained manpower and finance, in view of the traditional place of the chief in Tswana society and the very high regard in which he was held. Even today this influence though diminished is still a significant factor in some districts. Nevertheless, bearing this in mind, local government has made a considerable advance and councils are growing in stature and gaining a better understanding of their duties and responsibilities. It may be that experience will show that modifications in form or even in procedures will be necessary but provided that they continue with the same degree of keenness which they have shown so far their future should be assured.

Acknowledgements

Sir A. Pim: *Report-Bechuanaland Protectorate: Financial and Economic position.* A. Sillery: *The Bechuanaland Protectorate.* Richard P. Steven: *Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland.* A. Dixon: Unpublished papers on Local Government in Botswana. Government of Botswana: Annual Reports of Ministry of Local Government and Lands 1966/7. Bechuanaland Protectorate: Local Government in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, *Legislative Council Paper* 21/64.

Quarterly Notes

United Nations – *Meeting of experts on credit institutions of local authorities*

The Public Administration Division, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, has undertaken a comparative study of credit institutions for local authorities with the collaboration of the International Information Centre for Local Credit (IICLC), a non-governmental organization with consultative status in ECOSOC.

The study is intended to develop guides to assist governments of developing countries in deciding whether to establish national institutions specializing in loans for local government units and for countries which decide to establish one, in organizing, financing and staffing institutions suited to their needs and conditions.

The importance of such guides is underscored by the wide gap between the financial and administrative capability of local authorities and the role often ascribed to them in national plans for social and economic development. Urbanization is everywhere on the upsurge, the demand for greatly expanded municipal services and improved conditions of urban life is widely felt, and the pressure mounts for vastly increased capital resources to finance the infrastructure for urban development like schools, housing, water supply, roads, health facilities and public market. Only the largest local authorities in some countries are usually able to obtain capital funds by tapping conventional market facilities, e.g. by issuing bonds or borrowing from banks or other investors.

But most local authorities, especially in developing countries, do not have such facilities available to them or are unable to meet the conventional market requirements for provision of loans. Where local authorities must rely on higher levels of government for loans and special arrangements do not exist to ensure that they get a fair share of the capital resources available to the government, local authorities have little, if any, opportunity to obtain the investment funds required to enable them to contribute to local development.

In a number of countries, specialized credit institutions (e.g. local government loan boards, autonomous institutes, or co-operative banks for municipalities) have been established to assist local authorities in financing capital works involved in economic and social development. The main function of these institutions is to make loans to local authorities under terms and conditions that are compatible with the financial capabilities of local authorities, i.e., low rates of interest and long maturities. Some provide, in addition, advisory services and training to improve the administration of the project financed or the general administration of local authorities.

Source *IULA Newsletter* Sept./Oct. 1970.

New Zealand – *The Published Accounts*

The general proposition that accounting is an information process is as applicable to published accounts as to any other. Specifically, the published accounts are for the information of the general public, and the measure of their utility is the extent to which they tell the public what the public wants, or ought to know, in a form intelligible to readers uninstructed in accounting method. A somewhat curious, but not uncommon, argument is that since the public shows no interest in authorities' accounts, there is no point in providing them. There seem to be three answers to this. In the first instance, accounting is a way of informing the public about the affairs of local government. Probably, since it might fairly be said that the only local government documents closely scrutinized by every citizen are rate demands, electricity bills and the like, it is the most useful way of arousing public interest. We can hardly bewail lack of interest in local government if we fail to provide the data on which interest might be founded.

Secondly, elected members and officers are, in a very real sense, agents for the community. They are entrusted with community resources and charged with community responsibilities, and it is an agent's duty to account for his stewardship. The public might choose not to read the report, but such a choice does not absolve the Board or Council of its obligation.

Thirdly, and probably the most important reason for public disinterest, such is the nature of the accounts of territorial local authorities, as they are at present published, that only the most enthusiastic citizen would try to make sense of them, and even he would probably be confounded.

Some territorial authorities have made efforts to overcome the "communications gap" by presenting easy-to-read booklets on council finances, but there are dangers in this practice. Some such booklets do not say so much "what we have done", as "how well we have done", and even when they are honest they are not necessarily believed. Publications without statutory authority or audit certification invite suspicion.

Source: *New Zealand Local Government*, August, 1970.

Britain – *Comment on the* 1970 *Cambridge Conference*

From: Mr. H. J. Nyamu, Director, Kenyanisation of Personnel Bureau
Nairobi

This was the first time I have ever attended a Cambridge Conference. I therefore feel somewhat diffident to engage in an assessment, critical or otherwise, of a Conference that has been going on for many years and to which many great minds have contributed highly valuable ideas and practical solutions to some of the problems facing developing countries today.

I had extremely high hopes of attending this Conference and coming out with some crystalized ideas and certain solutions to the problem of unemployment in the developing world in general and in Kenya particularly. If I do not involve myself in statistics and in a certain language that might appear more acceptable to some people, it is because I was one of the few non economists and I can only put my personal impressions in the language of an administrator.

I believe very strongly that the choice of the subject i.e. "employment opportunities in the seventies", could not have been better for the beginning of the 1970 decade. Unless something very drastic and permanent is done by developing countries, responsible governments in these countries will be faced with events to shake their very foundations in the way of mass riots and disorder arising from "educated" but unemployed youth.

In my view however the venue for the Conference should for various reasons have been in one of the developing countries. As an administrator I could see no sense in long arguments during the Conference about whether unemployment was critical for these countries or not, about how unemployment could not be measured or "quantified" as some participants preferred to put it. Visits to rural areas would have been of tremendous help in assisting the participants to have an insight into the problems of rural development that deserve priority in terms of planning and capital provision and I am still convinced that only through this kind of venue would the Conference do justice to the subject. When therefore a Conference topic deals with problems that do not appear to have particular relevance to Cambridge or Paris or New York or to any part of what are referred to as developed countries, it is only logical that the Conference organisers should give some thought to the most logical venue for such a Conference so that most of its time deliberative and excursional time could be devoted, in some measure, to the subject matter.

It was my feeling that perhaps there were too few administrators and non economists present and that the Conference was dominated by economists of the University type whose practical experience of the kind of problems that the Conference was dealing with was probably limited to research and production of papers with accurate and (sometimes inaccurate) statistics to support their theories and initial premises. It should not be forgotten that economists base their theories and papers and figures mostly supplied by the countries' Governments, notably Ministries of Economic Planning and Development which, as some people will recognise, are faced with tremendous problems of ensuring that the statistics they obtain are accurate both in straight forward collection and also in interpretation. I felt therefore that the Conference had a dearth of representatives from practical men be they economists or administrators, who were able to sober down academic economists who, to me, appeared as much involved in micro "argumentation" and etymological finesse.

Nevertheless the virtue of the Conference was that it did permit ordinary administrators and non economists to argue with economists at Cambridge.

To illustrate my complaints about the composition of the Conference between the theoretical economists as opposed to what might be called practical economists and administrators however, when in the course of introducing his paper Mr. David Morse introduced the new term namely "dethronement" of the GNP, this at once became a catch phrase for all manners of "dethronements". Admittedly some of the speakers used this term on the lighter side of things and I have no complaint about this. As an administrator whose only claim to graduate status is my having read history, I quite often hesitated to say to an economist "I am hungry, let us go to the dining hall", for fear he might answer, "I am sure you are making a very gross generalisation because hunger implies a certain kind of deficiency – it may be food, love etc. In any case can you quantify your hunger!" In case I am misunderstood, on this count, let me in the same breath say that I found certain papers extremely down to earth and yet written by economists, but economists with an ability deliberately to reject theoretical aloofness in favour of consideration of down to earth problems. Some of these papers were entirely lacking in any trace of economic jargon. I should like to mention for instance that of Dr. Ghai not because he is my countryman, and not necessarily because it was a paper on Kenya, but because it avoided what I might call excessive theoretical economic terminology and described the situation as it really was. There were also excellent papers by David Morse, Guy Hunter, Dr. Schumacher among others.

The tussle between the academic and the administrator was evident right through discussion groups and plenary sessions. It was, in my opinion at times quite fruitful, at times quite pointless. Sometimes the ideologies of the "socialist" and private enterprise world clashed. For example, certain emotional out-pourings from one participant against a paper based on the Cuban experience and the replies received from a representative from the United States who kept on quoting the Korean experience and conveniently forgetting to let us know which Korea he was talking about.

The subject, however, did not lend itself to the easy tabulation of practical solutions. I am at this point reminded of a speaker who said something like "all Kenya needs do to solve their unemployment problem is to levy a coffee cess on large European estates". As one of the delegates from Kenya said on this point this was a very superficial statement and it was of course shown to be utterly wrong and unhelpful.

One of the greatest omissions from the Conference discussions was how the solutions suggested to solve unemployment in developing countries would be financed. I think that it was in the mind of every delegate from developing countries to enquire how money would be found to carry out any solutions that might be suggested, but for some unknown reason nobody raised this point. As an optimist, however, I am prepared to concede that probably representatives from developing countries took it for granted that if some viable solutions were forthcoming from the Conference then their Governments were going to look upon such programmes favourably from the point of view of capital provision through loans and/or grants.

Having so far preoccupied myself mostly on the negative side of the Conference, I must briefly mention a few positive aspects. Discussions quite apart, one was struck by the predominating air of friendliness among the participants – great and small and this gave everyone confidence and helped everyone to settle down right from the start. Contact outside the Conference Hall and the discussion groups were very useful contributions that the Conference brought about. One could even say that equally important business of all kinds was transacted between the participants when they were not officially meeting.

On the whole, I did not feel that there was any aspect of solving unemployment that was not discussed except the financing of suggested solutions as I have already mentioned. Our problem was one of making suggestions like "raising agricultural incomes" or "rural industrialisation" without going further to suggest the manner of doing just that. But, these suggestions and many other useful ones having been made, it is quite logical that individual countries should have the responsibility of examining them further and putting the meat on the bones, relating their activities to the circumstances peculiar to their own countries. One must concede that it would not have been justifiable to go into greater details under the erroneous assumption that what was possible and effective in Pakistan was equally possible and effective in Kenya.

Out of the tangle of ideas from papers, debate and group discussions, each country has a rich source of ideas. The most urgent problem is, therefore, for each country not to regard the Cambridge Conference as having solved the problem of unemployent or having provided employment opportunities for the seventies, but as having pointed the way to that end. It is for each developing country to take on the task from there and provide its own employment opportunities utilising the general ideas that each participant took home. Kenya is doing just that and papers to the Cabinet are already there! They are, however, confidential.

From: Dr. F. Kavoussi, Director-General, Studies Bureau, Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Iran.

My impressions of the Conference can be summarised as follows:

1. The Conference was of a high level of intelligence and so there prevailed a high intellectual atmosphere. To this was added the appreciable eagerness of the members to make their own contributions to the Conference.
2. Every activity of the Conference was well planned and in good order: plenary sessions, group discussions, trips and finally meals which were a gastronome's delight.
3. Unfortunately the Conference was dominated by economists and this was the main reason for a serious weakness in the Conference discussions. It meant that insufficient attention was paid to the social and political dimensions of the problems discussed.
4. Conference tried to make, through studying the problems of certain developing countries, general suggestions for all LDCs. But the result of this did not appear to be successful. The reason for this is simply that all LDCs are not at the same stage of development, and besides they are of such a variety of social and political structures that where a suggestion for alleviating the problems of one country would be useful to that country, it would not necessarily be applicable to other countries.
5. Yet the result of the Conference should be considered as a positive

one. The majority of the exchanges, which took place in plenary sessions and group discussions, were of an undeniable interest to all developing countries, and can certainly help those countries in finding solutions to their own problems.

From: Mr. George A. Ige, Permanent Secretary, The Cabinet Office, Lagos, Nigeria.

The 1970 bi-ennial Cambridge Conference organised by the Overseas Studies Committee, at Jesus College, Cambridge blasted into orbit with a thought-provoking paper by Mr. David Morse who retired recently from the post of Director-General, International Labour Organisation after serving that organisation for 22 years. To some of the participants, Mr. Morse had succeeded in passing the buck! However justified such an observation might have been, what was important from the point of view of the Conference was an assessment of the employment opportunities during the next decade and how to improve them. It was inevitable that much of the discussion during the Conference gravitated round the unemployment situation in various parts of the world since it helped to bring sharply into focus the backlog of the problem, a knowledge of which was essential in offering practical and meaningful suggestions.

The Conference attracted a record number of participants drawn from varying backgrounds and experiences. It would have been disappointing if it had not, for the theme struck at the root of most of the social problems in nearly every part of the world today. As usual, the 1970 Conference had its crop of brilliant participants in H. Singer, Guy Hunter, Carl Eicher, Frances Stewart, Professor Raj, and George McRoboe, to mention a few.

I have now participated at two of these annual Conferences and on each occasion, I have come away convinced that the Cambridge Conference is the wrong place to look for a recipe to any national problem. It is meant to provide one with an opportunity for an exchange of ideas and experiences between the "haves" and the "have nots" to the mutual satisfaction of both.

The British Ministry for Overseas Development should proudly congratulate itself for being associated with a programme from which hundreds of people from various parts of the world have benefited. No less credit must be given to the Cambridge Overseas Committee and the Conference officials who have the resposibility of ensuring that the objective is achieved. It is certainly impossible for any participant at these Conferences to escape the impact of Ronald Robinson, the humorous but very competent and capable Chairman; assiduous personnel in the secretariat; Jonathan Lewis, the indefatigable and understanding Social Secretary and the very co-operative and seasoned domestic staff of Jesus College.

It was twelve glorious days inside and outside Jesus College in 1970. If you have not been to a Conference there, please endeavour to do so. It is worth it. But be prepared to work – and I mean to work really hard! In any case, you will find yourself on arrival in the hands of those gentlemen whose duty it is to ensure not only that your room is warm and comfortable but also that you make a useful contribution to the work of the Conference.

From: M. M. Rezaul Karim, First Secretary, Pakistan High Commission, London.

I feel that the conference provided a good opportunity for all participants not only to share their knowledge and experience in this field but also to benefit from the useful contributions made by many experts of international repute who attended the Conference. I am not sure if we have fully achieved the objective of devising the measures to solve the problem of unemployment in the Seventies, but the Conference has undoubtedly made some progress towards the understanding of the enormous dimension of the problem and towards the consideration of certain remedial actions. This process of exchange of views does help immensely, in my mind, delegates from many countries in their study and recommendations towards the formulation of relevant policies in their respective countries.

Furthermore, the academic atmosphere in Cambridge did provide to a public servant like me a very refreshing and welcome change. Needless to emphasize that the arrangements for the Conference were one of high order, and I enjoyed my participation fully and thoroughly.

Book Reviews

MICROSTATES AND MICRONESIA: Problems of America's Pacific Islands and Other Minute Territories, by STANLEY A. DE SMITH; *New York: New York University Press; London: University of London Press;* 1970. Pp. ix plus 193. $A 7.50.

This short monograph, undertaken by Professor de Smith while a Visiting Senior Fellow at New York University's Center for International Studies, is one of a series of Studies in Peaceful Change recently launched by the Center. The series title barely holds together studies ranging from essays in legal philosophy to a critical survey of the Peace Corps. Similarly, a comparison of the political and economic problems of small, dependent, mostly tropical and relatively remote island communities around the world is too slender a thread on which to hang a sustained analysis of any of the questions they raise. The author almost says so when he writes:

> This is best regarded as a politically unscientific essay. Like the Caucus race in *Alice in Wonderland*, it has no determinate beginning or end; and what lies in between is apt to beget confusion (p. 55).

Something of a melange lies between the rather dingy covers of this unhandsome volume. One chapter discusses the international status of small states in general, and suggests they have little to gain from membership of the United Nations Organization (even if they can acquire it) though much from its specialized agencies. Two chapters discuss the international status of dependent territories in general, and are ironical and occasionally indignant about the General Assembly's Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960 the (Anti-Colonialist Charter) and the single-minded or one-eyed, but only marginally effectual, vendettas pursued by the Committee of Twenty-four against administering powers. The contradictions which abound in the events and documents are succinctly stated, but there is no dissection, or even mention, of the controversies they have aroused among international lawyers. We learn nothing new unless we knew nothing of the subject.

The next two chapters make a rapid world tour of territories which were constitutionally dependent in 1969 and were small islands. They also briefly traverse the psychology of insularity, the advantages and embarrassments of islands possessions, the physical, economic and administrative hazards of island life, and some examples of trying to lead island dependencies toward self-government or independence. From these accounts warnings are adduced. Islanders tend to resist agglomeration into larger groups. They often prefer the umbrella of a wealthy and powerful patron-state to the uncertainties of independence, whatever the Committee of Twenty-four may say. Island governments need not be miniatures of those in large states; where there are poverty and smallness, Westminster and the Capitol make poor models – but sometimes it is equally hard for aspiring islanders and complacent colonialists to see this.

The remaining half of the book settles down to a rather fuller account of the political history and current condition of the United States Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (loosely, Micronesia), prefaced by a chapter on America's other Pacific dependencies. At the end, where Micronesia is shown to be now on the threshold of self-determination, the author momentarily seems to have written the rest of the book as preparation for a five-page lecture to the U.S. government on the course it should follow, freely larded with "oughts," "shoulds" and even "musts".

In most of what he says in this monograph, Professor de Smith is as lucid, urbane and sensible as in his well-known works on British and Commonwealth constitutional law. But taken as a whole it is less cogent than they are. Its construction shows signs of haste, with descriptive and narrative sections distributed haphazardly between constitutional and political analyses. More important, the apparent unity of its theme is really artificial. Few of the problems of dependent island communities are peculiar to them, because few are solely due to their being minuscule (a word irritatingly misspelt on about half of the naturally frequent occasions when it appears). De Smith does single out at one point the special drawbacks of smallness. Costs of government, of community services, of development, are disproportionately high; it is hard to attract and hold talented administrators; politics are unduly personal. But most of the problems discussed in his book – colonialism and decolonisation, political dependence, lack of resources, parochialism, isolation, external pressures, the traumas of economic development and social change – are the common lot of all the less developed countries, whether large or small, islands or landbound, dependent territories or emergent states. The treatment of these problems here is thin, because it ignores the wealth of comparative studies of their impact on more complex communities, and because it remains at the surface of social analysis, confined to constitutional forms, political institutions and a few economic and psychological generalities.

The book does not propose solutions to the problems of minicommunities, except for its closing homily on behalf of the 85,000 Micronesians. If it is handy as an introduction to some of the wider topics relating to dependent territories – such as the history of Japan's Pacific mandates or the tension between what dependent peoples want and what the United Nations prescribes – this is due partly to the clarity of its summaries, and partly to the discriminating reference lists that follow each chapter.

R. S. PARKER

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDEPENDENT FIJI, by E. K. FISK; *Australian National University Press, Canberra*, 1970; index; pp. 84; A$ 1.95.

This short book, which (despite its title) appears to have been written before Fiji became independent, is based on a single central thesis. The high growth industries – industry, tourism, commercial agriculture – are those in which Indian, European, Chinese and "other" citizens have an advantage in skills, sophistication, and an established footing. If the economy is pushed along even faster along these lines, the Fijians themselves will be hopelessly left behind in the economic race, absorbing surplus labour into an increasingly impoverished rural subsistence economy.

There is something to be said for this thesis; the danger is real. But it is put forward in a somewhat woolly way, and the remedies suggested appear singularly inorganic and artificial. It is woolly first because the author has never clearly defined what he means by "subsistence" and "commercial" agriculture. If I grow a food crop and eat it all, I am presumably in subsistence agriculture; if I eat some of it and sell the rest, the rest is, presumably, a cash crop and commercial; if I grow and export rice, sell it, and buy some rice which is preferred for its taste or cooking quality, I am presumably "commercial". Secondly, the author makes much play with what he calls "affluent" subsistence, illustrating it rather strangely with an example of an "affluent" subsistence farmer who, having little or no cash, could not pay to have his children go to school (or, presumably, to buy a bicycle, furniture, a transistor, a wrist watch, etc., etc. – things which are normally typical of relative affluence). Affluent subsistence appears to mean having enough land to eat quite well, on three days' work a week – a condition which many Thais and Ugandans achieved a long time ago; as the author points out, it is a wasting asset: one might add that it is not a very useful concept.

This loose distinction between commercial and subsistence agriculture leads the author into a strange proposition that the Fijians must go in for "intensified subsistence". This appears to mean that they should grow (and eat) their food requirements by more efficient cultivation of smaller acreages, which would release land for landless Indians. This does not seem a very cheerful prospect for Fijians, who will still have no money to buy a watch or send their sons to school. The suggestion that they might be helped to develop their agriculture more efficiently by production for the market is discussed as mere wishful thinking. Curiously enough however, many subsistence farmers in many parts of the world have done just that.

The author then moves on to his "big push" solution – the Institute for Fijian Participation, which should be set up with the necessary power and finance to push Fijians into the growth industries. The I.F.P. should set up urban hostels for job-seeking Fijians, give them information about job-opportunities "from day to day", provide contacts and introductions, "advice about where to go and how to conduct" themselves, and much else. One wonders how wise it is to treat self-respecting Fijians as a bunch of moronic yokels, and whether it might not be better to develop the very real skills and knowledge they have about their own environment.

From this point on the book, which started sober, factual and well-informed, takes off into a deluge of imperatives and admonitions – "The Board must – the Government must – the Fijians must". There is, indeed, a tone of self-assurance and complacency about the book which seems inappropriate when one is writing about other people's countries. From the foreword, when O.H.K. Spate congratulates the author on his "pellucidly simple style" and "almost classical elegance," and the author congratulates

Mr. Spate on his "masterly" book, we are in a very cosy party of the A.N.U. – indeed "some of us have begun or built up our reputations on Fijian work". A little more reference to non-A.N.U. reports by distinguished administrators and scholars, a little more awareness of what has been tried elsewhere in training African entrepreneurs in competition with Indians, of what the Kikuyu, Kisii, Chagga, farmers in Africa, or the Thai, Punjabi, Comilla or Pueblo subsistence farmers have achieved by their own efforts and government help (and not merely the success of the capital-intensive tree-crop schemes of Malaysia) might have helped to build these reputations even higher.

GUY HUNTER

PATTERNS OF DOMINANCE, by PHILIP MASON, *Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations, London,* 1970; pp. 377; £3.50.

Mr. Mason describes this book as an attempt "to analyse, in various parts of the world, situations in which different ethnic groups were living together in harmony or tension, and to enumerate and to assess the changing factors present in each case, trying to reach some conclusions as to why one situation was tense and another relaxed". Its sweep is massive, making use of area studies by a remarkably distinguished team of academics and others. Indeed, one of the principal merits of a beautifully written study is a constant checking of theory against examples, many of the latter coming from the author's own extensive experience in India and Africa.

Two central theses which are demonstrated again and again are that colour prejudice preceded imperialism and that racial attitudes can usually be related to class structure.

In so broad and stimulating a study the individual reader is likely to take issue on a number of judgements. Is it true (page 216) that the British had *always* repudiated the racist answer that the natives are permanently inferior, and professed the paternalist view that they would one day grow up and be free? Many late 19th Century politicians, administrators and explorers who had been nourished on the pseudo-scientific theories of Social Darwinism and of the Anthropological Society of London could be quoted as believing in the permanent need for British administration of "primitive" peoples. Mr. Mason's insistence on the temporary character of British occupation in India seems rather too emphatic in failing to indicate that the question of whether British rule in India was permanent or temporary was keenly debated right from Warren Hasting's time to that of Curzon.

It may be questioned whether the factor of physical climate has been given quite the emphasis which it deserves in relation to racial attitudes; and the co-relationship between racial attitudes and the percentage of people of different colour within a country might usefully have been explored in greater depth.

A fascinating question, with which the book has no space to deal, is the reason for the different treatment of people of mixed race under various colonial systems, as indicated for example, in the comparative status of

Eurasians in the government services of British, Dutch, French and Portuguese colonies. On a detailed point, it seems a little unfair to the Belgians to instance King Leopold's Congo as an example of imperial government rather than of company rule.

There are many other issues, great and small, in this mellow book, the fruit of deep personal experience and concern, as well as of profound scholarship, which the reader will be left wishing to pursue over the port with one of the last of the great line of scholar administrators which the ICS produced. The book will be invaluable to the librarians of institutions whose members are encouraged to cross the confines of disciplines and of regions and to question the particular historical attitudes in which they have grown up.

RICHARD SYMONDS

PLANNING EDUCATION FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: ECONOMIC AND MANPOWER PERSPECTIVES, by RICHARD JOLLY; *East African Publishing House*; pp. xxviii plus 168; sh.23.00 in East Africa.

The literature on education and economic development and advice on the planning of education to this end expands continually. In view of his close experience in this field in Africa, a contribution by Dr. Jolly is to be welcomed.

After an introduction in which the case against planning education in financial terms and for planning in terms of manpower is argued, Chapter 1 develops at some length the important idea of an "educational profile" in three African countries. This is an analysis of the stock in the population of educated men and women at different levels of attainment. There follows an examination of manpower flows in the education system.

Chapter 3, consisting of more than a quarter of the book, is a detailed case study of the expansion of education in Uganda. The remaining three chapters consider limitations on expansion, optimal strategies for expansion and, finally, long-run educational planning.

Throughout the book there is emphasis on the need for long-term planning: a period of twenty years is regarded almost as essential. At the same time Dr. Jolly recognizes that political change is not an unknown phenomenon in Africa. It is somewhat difficult at times to reconcile the essential nature of a long-term plan with the inevitable change and uncertainty in conditions of political instability.

Much of what is said of the factors involved in educational planning – size of enrolment, teacher/pupil ratio, supply and qualifications of teachers, salaries – have always [and before the advent of the "planner"] been recognized as of the essence. It does not always help – and may even hinder – if these somewhat obvious notions are cloaked in the obscurity of complex algebraic equations. That they should appear is perhaps inevitable in a doctoral thesis written by an economist for economists.

This, however, is a mild criticism. Dr. Jolly draws attention to many aspects which are too often neglected – or swept under the carpet. One of these, to which he constantly returns, is the level of teachers' salaries both as a proportion of the cost of education and in relation to the general wage level. Influenced as they have been by comparability with expatriate rates, he is here in tune with René Dumont's contention. Whether it will ever be politically possible to achieve wage rates realistic to a country's resources is, perhaps, arguable.

The book contains many valuable statistical tables, but it is surprising that no reference [other than a brief passing comment] is made to the size of the very young age cohorts. The birth rate and survival rate is everywhere much higher than the net population increase rate and an understanding of the size of the child population pressing to enter school is essential for any planner.

Due attention is paid to the problem of wastage and repetition and a formula described for its calculation. Here, of course, a difficulty arises. As a civil servant in an Asian country naively once said: "We know our low-level statistics are suspect but you can rely on our high-level statistics". To what extent can one place reliance on statistics from the grass roots where an under-qualified teacher is required to give details of drop-outs, repeaters, transfers with a suspicion that, if the figures do not please his superior, consequences unpleasant to himself may follow?

In the final upshot an education plan is a *political* decision which must for its fulfilment take into account the desires and aspirations of the people at large. It is for the "planner" either to influence this political decision or to shape the structure which will best bring it to fruition. This is essentially a function of administration and there is a danger in present circumstances of a dichotomy between planning and administering, leaving the administrator in the position of adjusting the nuts and bolts of a machine designed by the planner who may be out of touch with the realities of the situation.

This book may help to persuade Ministers of Finance that the costs of education should not *only* be viewed in relation to their share of the budget. If it can do this it will be of great service – provided that Dr. Jolly's other arguments and suggestions are borne in mind.

P. S. TREGEAR.

THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND, by JOSEPH REDLICH and FRANCIS W. HIRST. Second Edition edited by BRYAN KEITH-LUCAS; *Macmillan*; £3.50 (70s.) net.

How strange it must seem that the standard work on the history of local government in England was written in 1903 by a 34-year-old Moravian in collaboration with a young English barrister. Written in German it was translated into English by Hirst.

And yet it remains as Professor Keith-Lucas says in his excellent introduction "a clear and accurate account of the history of local government" and "it remains unequalled and unrivalled".

Keith-Lucas himself a great authority on local government and now Professor of Political Studies at the University of Kent has edited the 2nd edition and has rewritten the Epilogue, which he wrote for the 1958 reprint, to bring it up to date and to cover the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government of 1969.

Any student of local government would find this book of intense interest and it should also be read by students of the political history of England. It traces the slow growth of local self government up to the Local Government Act of 1894. Here this book, first published in 1903, had to stop. In the view of the authors, English local government at that time epitomised the triumph of democracy "England has created for herself self government in the true sense of the word . . . "

But wait! Keith-Lucas in his Epilogue has brought the story up to date – in 50 pages he has brilliantly condensed the history of the changes in the last seventy or so years since 1903 including the Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government of 1969.

To read the concluding paragraphs of the 1969 report makes one wonder whether it refers to another England and to another system to that extolled by Redlich and Hirst. It proposes "a radical reorganization of the existing structure".

"If we are not willing to face the pains involved (in this reorganization) the prospect for local government is black. Local governors under the present system, we are convinced, cannot grapple effectively with their problems; this indeed was generally admitted to us".

"During the next decade, unless the system is reformed, *local government will be increasingly discredited* and will be gradually replaced by Agents of the central government". This surely is going a little beyond the usual British habit of self denigration!

One of the present dilemmas is the conflict between "efficiency" and "participation" the latter a much overused word at the moment. The former word suggests larger local authorities with adequate finance so that all services may be well administered with first class officials. The latter word "participation" seems to imply that, for example, if the inhabitants of a big city need to flood a valley 50 miles away in order to create a reservoir, then this should be decided by the 50 people living in the valley and not by the 500,000 parched and thirsty people who dwell in the city.

If and when the British Government decide to reform local government on the lines suggested by the Royal Commission or otherwise, then will be the time to write a new history of local government in England and who more suitable for the task than Bryan Keith Lucas?

R. S. McDOUGALL.

THE OAS IN TRANSITION, by M. MARGARET BALL; *Duke University Press, Durham, N.C.* 1969; pp. 721; $19.50.

The Organiatzion of American States claiming to be the oldest regional and international organization in the world, celebrates its eightieth anniversary in 1970 with the coming into force of a substantial streamlining of its Charter and structure, the 1967 amendments to the 1948 Charter having now been ratified by the necessary two-thirds of the 24 member states.

The "transition" with which this book is concerned is in the main the change in the structure and functioning of the Organization which is reflected in the revised Charter. At the same time this most recent change is studied against the background of the historical development of the Inter-American System since the Bolivarian Conference of 1826, and more particularly since World War II. This historical treatment is valuable, for the OAS is a complex organization which cannot adequately be understood except in the context of the way in which inter-American relationships have evolved and except by considering how far the different organs of the OAS have come to be adapted to reflect the political and economic initiatives and tensions which hold sway within the System. If the result is a long book the student of inter-American affairs will not complain. There has not previously been published a really comprehensive analysis of the development of the OAS and your reviewer has little doubt that focussed as it is on the institutional change brought about by the revised Charter the book will be standard text for some time to come; in this sense one shares the author's regret that she has not gone on to include in the book an account of the development of the Central American Common Market and of LAFTA.

Until recently the member states of the OAS have been the 20 Latin American republics and the United States, and the history of the OAS has been largely one of the love-hate relationship between the US and its Latin American neighbours within an essentially closed system. It is therefore important to note, as a straw in the wind, that the new Charter has been ratified by the three most recently joined members of the Organization – Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados and Jamaica. *The OAS in Transition* does not attempt to forecast what this may mean in terms of the future development of inter-American relations, but it hazards a guess that the OAS may well be set, under its new Charter, for a significant change in the pattern of its activity and responsibility, especially if Caribbean membership extends further, and indeed if Canada, already closely associated, applies for membership (by July 1970 Canada is suggesting the possibility of attaching a "permanent observer").

In the US/Latin American relationship two trends have persisted since the beginning, though each has changed in emphasis and direction over the years. The first is that of regional co-operation to preserve national territorial integrity. The second is that of regional co-operation in respect of the ground rules of continental trade and economic development.

At first the American republics were concerned to preserve, by regional alliance, their newly-won independence from interference from the Old World. Later the Latin Americans were concerned to preserve themselves from US interference, and more recently still the US in particular has been concerned to preserve the Americas in general from Communist subversion. What is significant in this context is that the OAS has developed as the principal forum within which the continental disputes and negotiations have proceeded.

Similarly with the second theme, that of trade and economics. In the mid-nineteenth century the initiative belonged to the US which was intent on bringing about a homogeneous system of commercial practice whereby US trade and investment in Latin America could be developed. Later the Latin American states accepted the trade relations which were so developed as being a means of claiming for themselves a guaranteed and protected access to the US market. More recently still the US has associated its Latin American aid policy, under the Alliance for Progress, with the OAS through the establishment of the Inter-American Committee for Economic Development, and in the last few years has come to accept that consideration of the Latin American claim for preferred treatment in respect of imports into the US should be dealt with through the OAS and may have to be taken seriously.

In organizational terms therefore what emerges is the gradual, if discontinuous, building up of the OAS as the normal, if not so far particularly successful, means of negotiation between the US and the Latin Americans in respect of political, trade and economic problems and disputes. However much, then, it has been fashionable, especially in Latin America, for the OAS to be regarded as a bad joke, whether for its complexity and inefficiency or for its appearance of being no more than an instrument of US neo-colonialism, the fact is the OAS has survived and continues to adapt itself as a closed regional organization for negotiation and, in increasing measure, for co-operation. It would be interesting to compare the relative fortunes of ECLA and the OAS in this respect: it was in ECLA that the Latin Americans after World War II attempted to develop a regional approach of their own but the UN regional organization has not been able to maintain a very serious challenge to the OAS; it was less well adapted (and financed) to serve the US preference for a closed system.

The new structure for the OAS is more streamlined and, in Latin American terms, more "democratic" than the former. In the first place the General Assembly, replacing the inter-American Conference as the chief organ of the OAS, is to meet annually and not every five years. If it does meet annually (the Conference rarely met on time, but rather as Special Conferences at times of crisis) this might enable the member states to review and control the activities of the Organisation with reasonable regularity. More important perhaps, the General Secretariat, replacing the Pan American Union as the administrative centre of the Organisation, now has something like effective responsibility for the Routine servicing of the General Assembly and its three permanent Councils, and as the chief officers (and an increasing number of the permanent staff in general) are Latin American and not US citizens, the General Secretariat should become more efficient, for being more credible in the eyes of the non-US members of the Organization.

The OAS in Transition deals in detail with the various institutional changes and with the functions and structure of each of the principal organs of the OAS, that is the three Councils, and the Special Conferences and related organizations. Equally valuable is the careful examination of the finances of the OAS and its dependent and related institutions; for it the US is the dominant partner she is very much the dominant financial source and any forecast of the future of the OAS as a regional "alliance" must not overlook the fact that by and large the US is footing the bill.

In *The OAS in Transition* therefore we have a comprehensive study of the forces at work within the inter-American system, and of the development of an organization which is intended to control these forces and to give them direction, and to do so in the context largely of a closed system. The book will be essential reading as a starting point for observing how the transition now proceeds.

W. WOOD

THE HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE IN BRITAIN, by Richard A. Chapman; *Constable, London*, 1970; pp. x, 194; £2.10p.

The Higher Civil Service in Britain is concerned primarily with people rather than institutions or structures. The basis of much of the description is a survey conducted by the author of 35 Principals who entered the Administrative Class as direct entrants in 1956, but the material derived from this survey is supplemented from other of the research studies carried out as part of the enquiry conducted by the Fulton Commission. On the basis of this material the author builds up a picture of the sort of people some higher civil servants are: the way they are recruited and from what background; the process by which they are socialized into the role of administrative class civil servants; the range of work they are engaged in, their attitudes towards it, and the conditions within which they carry out this work; and their social and political attitudes and style of life outside the office. At least in relation to his group of 1956 entrants the author is able to present a rounded account of these people, and one that is all the more striking because it includes an account of their attitudes towards political parties and party politics and their subjective assessments of themselves in terms of social class.

While presenting his account of higher civil servants as people, Dr. Chapman takes every opportunity to place existing situations in their historical perspective, to draw comparisons and to point to shortcomings and problems. He outlines the development of the civil service arguing that its inspiration derives from the Indian Civil Service of the early nineteenth century, and he places current recruitment practices in the context of the development of recruitment methods from the last century. Some of his more telling elaborations on the conclusions to be drawn from his research material come in his comparison with the account of the higher civil service presented by H. E. Dale in his book *The Higher Civil Service of Breat Britain* published 30 years ago and dealing with the service as it existed in the 1930s. The impression of a service which in terms of its background, attitudes and style of life was characteristically upper middle class, is one which Dr. Chapman finds far removed from the current situation where characteristically his civil servants live in dormitory suburbs, find questions about membership of a London Club amusingly outdated and feel themselves to be "part of a classless sub-society". Beyond the background and stimulating comparisons the author repeatedly draws attention to how little he or indeed anyone, within the service or outside, knows about the civil service. Particularly significant here is the lack of knowledge about precisely what work higher civil servants do, for without knowing this rational personnel policies become impossible to operate. In the author's assessment it was characteristic of the amateurism which the Fulton Commission criticised in others while practising itself that it should have advocated radical reforms without acquiring such essential knowledge. Only now is this deficiency being remedied through the work of the Civil Service Department. But Dr. Chapman's comments about how little is known at a level beyond conventional wisdom are not directed only to the range and character of work done by higher civil servants, it is a recurring theme in the comments.

The material Dr. Chapman presents is of considerable interest and his comments are always stimulating. It is also a virtue of the book that it prompts a wish for more. Much of the book is dependent on the survey of the 1956 direct entrants; and the question is left of how valid is the author's extension of the conclusions from this to higher civil servants in general. There is inevitably a wish that he had compared this group with those entering from the Executive Class, or those coming in directly as Principals at a later age and from different employment. Perhaps the least convincing part of the book is that dealing with historical development for the author's perceptiveness in relation to more contemporary developments seems to leave him when he considers patronage, the origin of late nineteenth century developments and the significance of the Northcote Trevelyan Report. All told, however, this is a most readable and informative book and it is to be hoped that the path that he has opened will be one down which others will be given the opportunity to pass.

D. J. MURRAY

Other Books Received

FOREIGN AID, Ed. JAGDISH BHAGWATI and RICHARD S. ECKHAUS; *Penguin Books*, 1970; index; pp. 351; £0.50

This latest addition to Penguin modern economics readings contains 13 contributions from a dozen specialists in the economics of foreign aid, which the editors have collected (with one exception) from publications during the First Development Decade.

There are six parts covering "objectives", "criteria", "distribution", "multilateralism v bilateralism", "tying" and "commodity assistance" – Headings that many will associate with the Cambridge Conferences on Development in the Sixties. Advocates of increased aid often find their philosophy best suited by the arguments for multilateral aid; for them and for those less committed who seek a balanced approach, Lord Balogh's contribution (very much on the lines of his 1966 Cambridge paper) should be compulsory reading; more multi-lateral aid, Yes – the multilateralization of bilateral aid – No, and extreme advocacy of the latter is only likely to discourage many policy-makers from the advocacy of foreign aid itself. There are those, like Dr. Singer, who as dedicated internationalists, deplore the extent to which aid is "tied" and who can provide powerful arguments to show why tying is harmful to recipients, of limited value to donors, and how alternatives could be mutually more beneficial both economically and politically. But unless and until there is international accord over the totality of aid and its supply and over the international monetary system, it is surely unrealistic to expect any donors to sacrifice tying unilaterally in the face of their often serious balance of trade and foreign exchange crises.

This volume provides a modestly-priced reference book for economists and students concerned with foreign aid and merits a wide readership.

DEVELOPMENT GUIDE; *George Allen & Unwin for The Overseas Development Institute*, 1970; index; pp. 264; £2.50

This is a revised edition of O.D.I's. earlier Guide and now contains details of the purposes and structures of 210 organizations together with the names of senior staff members. The basic criteria for inclusion in the Guide is that the organization should be concerned with and relevant to development in less developed countries. The Guide has been kept to manageable size by the exclusion of such categories as educational establishments, foundations, commercial concerns and social/cultural organizations for all of which yearbooks or directories already exist.

All those with an active interest in overseas development will need this Guide to hand upon their bookshelves.

THE CHALLENGE OF A DECADE, by ROBERT THEOBALD; *U.N. Centre for Economic and Social Information* (U.N. Sales No. E.70.1.26); pp. 31; $0.75

"I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control." (U Thant, May 1969). The author provides a series of vignettes all as if written in October 1980 at the close of the Second Development Decade. Half imagine that the Secretary-General's words have gone unheeded and paint the picture of resultant gloom and doom, half that the world has hearkened and with the UN triumphant faces a happy prosperous and progressive new era – hence the sub-title to this pamphlet is "Global Development or Global Breakdown": however, man being the strange animal that he is, will doubtless evolve a compromise that will enable him to enter the Eighties neither developed nor yet quite broken down.

BUDGETING, PROGRAMME ANALYSIS AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS in EDUCATIONAL PLANNING, *O.E.C.D., Paris*; pp. 304; £1.50

This volume contains the papers presented at a meeting of experts convened in 1968 by the O.E.C.D. Committee for Scientific and Technical Personnel.

Dr. J. Vaizey in his "personal impression" chapter makes the following summary of consensus viewpoints:–

a. The educational system with its multiple objectives and levels of decision-making has a special need of techniques such as cost-effectiveness analysis for the evaluation of its programmes, and for budgeting systems which make these possible.

b. Secondly, programme budgeting and cost-benefit analysis are important for organizing thinking about relationships between objectives and their implementation.

Thirdly, it is important to adopt a budgetary procedure that allows a periodic review of total programmes, as opposed to an annual budgeting procedure in which very large proportions of expenditure are already, in fact, committed.

c. Fourthly, a number of models and formal budget structures exist for programme budgeting in education of various levels of administration and attention should be given to the provision of some specialised training to economists.

d. Fifthly, budgetary procedures and structures and administrative and planning procedures and structures are closely linked, and there is a major need for innovation and flexibility in both, so that complementary and conflicting objectives become apparent. They can be readily evaluated and incorporated within the budgetary system.

e. Sixthly, emphasis was laid on the importance of analytical studies to provide information relevant to the programme budgeting system.

EDUCATIONAL STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING SOCIETIES, by Adam Curle; *Tavistock Publications*; bibliography, index; pp. 180; £0.90

This second edition of Professor Curle's small book is published in the Social Science paperback series. The author advocates the development of an educational infrastructure in the Third World based on the realities of local social and economic needs (with "schools rooted in the Community") and not on concepts imported from the industrialized nations. He favours the Tanzanian policy of "education for self-reliance" and deplores the exploitation which he sees in the rich/poor nation raletionship in the educational field, and he deplores the role of the educated élite in many new countries who seek for themselves the selfish benefits of a new rich/poor relationship in their homeland. He would like to see an agricultural orientation to rural education which would be complete in itself, with secondary education separately structured, separately purposed within national development plans. This approach, already adopted in Tanzania, is one that poses a particular problem in itself. The tremendous post World War II impetus for education throughout the Third World was to no mean extent due to the opening of the door to higher education for the many. A restructured partial closing of the door will need a very great deal of social adjustment if it is to prove acceptable to parents and pupils alike.

CENTO SYMPOSIUM ON DEMOGRAPHIC STATISTICS, Ed. Mary Margaret Lawrence; *Central Treaty Organisation, Ankara*, appendces; pp. 331.

This volume contains the proceedings of a Symposium held in Karachi in November, 1968, including 23 selected conference papers and Dr. Irene B. Taueber's keynote address.

The principal recommendations agreed to by the Symposium were:

1. Priority should be given to demographic statistics as basic to economic development; to obtain the maximum contribution from demographic data and analyses requires appropriate administrative organization and finance, competent professional staff, integration/co-ordination of effort for optimum use of limited professional resources, appropriate university degree courses, research and training infrastructure, co-operation of all groups concerned in each country, and an inventory of qualified personnel.
2. Priority should be given to the forthcoming national censuses – decisions on methodology and content required 18 months prior to enumeration date. Complete enumeration should be limited to a small number of items (name, age, place, sex, household relationships) and samples for other queries. Need for preparatory work e.g. mapping and training, planning procedures emphasized including the need for a permanent well staffed census organization.
3. Further developments in the demographical field to improve the flow of vital statistics should be explored or developed e.g. in respect of sample surveys.
4. There should be continuing and increased co-ordination within the Region.

In her keynote address Irene Taueber drew particular attention to the effect on labour force expansion of a three per cent a year population increase.

The demographers have set out in full the desiderata for the effective provision of vital statistics. How far the diverse resources sought can in fact be made available within the Region now remains to be seen.

PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY, by Carole Pateman; *Cambridge University Press*, 1970; bibliography and index; pp. 122; £1.50

There are those who say that the ideal functioning of democracy was to be found in ancient Greece when all citizens could participate in political decision-taking, convened together in a vast Greek amphitheatre – albeit the many slaves were excluded. In modern sophisticated society the extent of popular participation in decision-taking has grown steadily less and while students demand their say, political theorists hold that popular participation in politics is of little importance to their theory of democracy. Mrs. Pateman disagrees and agrues that "we can still have a modern, viable theory of democracy which retains the notion of democracy at its heart" – in particular she advocates a participatory democracy for industry.

AN AFRICAN SCHOOL—A Record of Experience, by Kit Elliott, *Cambridge University Press*, 1970; £2.25

What does a British teacher expect to find in Africa? How far is it possible to brief the thousand or so teachers who still leave Britain each year to spend two or three years teaching?

Much thought has been given to such questions by the Overseas Development College at Farnham Castle and others. Rarely however has there been a more interesting account of an expatriate teacher's attempt to understand the background and state of mind of his students as Kit Elliott's record of experience at An African School on the plateau in North Nigeria. The book conjures up a vivid picture of the plateau people and provides a valuable insight into the problems and wider implications of teaching overseas.

DIPLOMATIC HANDBOOK, by R. G. Feltham; *Longman*; appendices & index; pp. 186; £2

Ralph Feltham directs the Foreign Service course at Oxford for overseas Study Fellows and so is admirably qualified to be author of a diplomatic handbook. The volume is intended for those embarking on a diplomatic career and in particular to those in rapidly expanding diplomatic services who are expected to acquire a wide knowledge of international relations but, owing to the lack of experienced staff, are never given the opportunity to do so.

Diplomatic relations, privileges and immunities, protocol and procedure, the diplomatic mission, the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consular officers, the United Nations and International Organizations, International Law and Practice, each receives a descriptive chapter and very useful appendices cover entertainment, international abbreviations, a glossary of diplomatic and economic terms and the organization of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London.

Besides the young diplomat to whom this small book will be a ready source of invaluable information, the general reader with an interest in foreign affairs and the working of diplomatic channels will find much of interest and a very useful addition to his own general knowledge.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE FRENCH CONSEIL d'ETAT, by MARGHERITA RENDEL; *Weidenfeld & Nicholson*, 1970; appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 320; £3

The *Conseil d'Etat* was created by Napoleon and has evolved over the succeeding century and a half – grown and developed with its own methodology and its own tradition. Thus France found the alternative to the Ombudsman by developing her own separate system of administrative law. The *Conseil* (under legislation of 1945) participates in drawing up laws and Rules of Public Administration, advises on other decrees and administrative problems, draws attention to the need for legislative, regulative and administrative reforms, judges administrative suits and has appellate jurisdiction over lower administrative courts, inspects administrative courts. Decrees in 1963 brought the administrative and litigation organs of the *Conseil* (which had been at loggerheads from time to time) closer together. The *Conseil* has been provided with protection from political pressure and has proved itself a capable guardian of the citizens rights against arbitary official action. There may be some matters of detail about which such a body should not be required to spend its time (e.g. name changing of voluntary bodies), but overall the *Conseil* has demonstrated the great value of the French system of administrative law, a system that Britain might well find it advantageous to adopt – even at this late stage of our constitutional development: indeed the complexities of modern government, it might be maintained, make the French administrative system the only kind which can safeguard the citizen from arbitary executive action when such action is only at the contemplative stage.

CROP LOAN SYSTEM, by T. P. S. CHAWDHARI and J. N. SHARMA; *National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad*; Rs. 12.

The author's study of the crop loan system in Andhra Pradesh and Punjab led them to the conclusion that the greatest need in the rural areas of developing countries such as India is for an extensive system of short-term production – purpose loans to be made readily available to farmers by their governments. The argument is clear: to produce more, farmers must spend more on improved inputs which can only be financed by borrowing as the great majority of farmers are small men with small means, negligible savings and little security to offer. Loans should be based on the farmer's productive capacity and where possible within a co-operative framework with which an organised marketing system should be integrated.

POLITICS IN GHANA 1946-1960, by DENNIS AUSTIN; *Oxford University Press* appendices, maps, bibliography, index; pp. 459; £1.25

This is a new Oxford paperback edition of Dennis Austin's major study of Ghanian politics from the end of the Second World War until 1964 – not long before Dr. Nkrumah's deposition – foreseen perhaps by the author when he concluded on a note of uncertainty as to the political future and with a footnote suggesting the possibility of a military *coup d'état*. The debasement of the high hopes and high ideals that stimulated the first years of independence, makes a sad story, admirably told and assessed by Dennis Austin and a salutory one for those who seek or hold political power in many lands besides Ghana.

RHODESIA, A HUMAN GEOGRAPHY, by GEORGE KAY; *University of London Press*, 1970; illustrated, maps, diagrams, index; pp. 192; £2.50

Professor Kay has followed his social geography of Zambia, with an admirable geography of Rhodesia. This has been very well produced with excellent maps, diagrams and photographs – all at the remarkably modest price of fifty shillings. In the final Chapter on "The national economy: its problems and prospects" the author makes clear that only when the existing social and racial conflicts are resolved and when African advancement can proceed and when the Land Apportionment Act can be (at least) amended, will there then be a real opportunity to develop the considerable natural resources which Rhodesia possesses. A radical change of attitude by the European minority who hold the reins of power is a prerequisite.

COLONIAL ISSUES IN BRITISH POLITICS, 1945-1961, by DAVID GOLDSWORTHY; *The Clarendon Press, Oxford*, 1971; appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 425; £4.50

David Goldsworthy presents a very readable and interesting account of Conservative and Labour party attitudes to the major Colonial issues that received parliamentary attention in the politically lively years from "Colonial Development" to "Wind of Change", from the bi-partisan days of Oliver Stanley to the controversial days of Central African Federation and turbulence in Kenya. The author's approach is liberal, sympathetic and non-partisan and he provides lively history as much of his material is based on personal interviews with leading political figures and their aides. Attention is appropriately drawn to the very special role of the late Andrew Cohen and to the rapport that existed in the Colonial Office between Ministers and civil servants. The influence that may have been brought to bear by the pre-independence Governors such as Baring, Twining or Turnbull, or by the new nationalist political leaders overseas such as Nyerere are not assessed here and might well provide the subject matter for a further volume.

THE IMPERIAL CONTROL OF COLONIAL LEGISLATION, 1813-1865, by D. B. SWINFEN; *Oxford University Press*, 1970; appendices, bibliography, index; pp. 202; £2.50

Laws enacted by Colonial legislatures were subject to a process of review. They were sent home for approval, amendment or disallowance. Dr. Swinfen's detailed study shows how carefully and surprisingly perhaps, how sparingly the Imperial Government exercised its overall control (albeit the power to make control effective grew steadily weaker) until The Colonial Laws Validity Act of 1865 was passed – "the only great statute of general Imperial constitutional law passed in the Nineteenth Century". At the time the effect was emancipatory, reducing the powers of the Westminster government to interfere with local legislation, and supporting "the Colonial Office policy of developing upon Colonial legislatures the responsibility for managing their own affairs". In the Twentieth Century, inevitably, the restrictive character of the Act attracted the most attention. One has much sympathy with the Legal Adviser, James Stephen, who reckoned that in 27 years he had to report his opinion on no less than 21,000 Colonial laws – "among all the duties which are to be discharged here, the most unwelcome . . . such a mass of uninteresting details!"

COUP D'ETAT, by EDWARD LUTTWAK; *Penguin Books;* appendices & index; pp. 205; £0.30

The author justifies his handbook on *coups*, teasingly and cynically on the grounds that *coups* are commonplace and that a guide can do no more than have a democratizing effect. The only real justification one can see is that the more governments and policy-makers know about the mechanics of coup-making, the better able they should be to forestall such happenings.

It makes solemn reading to be told that the *coup* is now a more widespread method of changing governments than elections (? true or false) and that over the past ten years there have been 73 *coups* in 46 countries, and in the post World War II era no less than 70 countries have been involved in successful *coups*. The appendices that provide this grim information form perhaps the most interesting part of this small book.

BIG MEN AND CARGO CULTS, by GLYNN COCHRANE; *Clarendon University Press; Oxford University Press*, 1970; maps & figures; bibliography and index; pp. 187; £2.25

Dr. Cochrane, administrator turned anthropologist, with sympathy and understanding based on practical experience and considerable research, examines cult movements in Papua and the Solomons and seeks to account for these phenomena which lack any really similar parallel in other parts of the world where the basis of a traditional way of life was upset culturally and structurally by the arrival of the white intruder.

Cochrane provides an explanation for the "vailala madness" of 1919, the effective "marching rule" leadership of the Nineteen Forties, and the "cargo cults" of the Sixties.

He contrasts the approaches to change followed by Governor Murray the sympathetic pragmatist with those urged by Williams the anthropologist. He suggests that the cults arose principally from the impact of the Europeans who had assumed the "big men" role for themselves and left a void where the islanders traditional "big men" had formerly stood. "Attempts to establish manhood in the traditional manner failed", hence emergence of non-traditional cults, as an alternative means was evolved. Cochrane notes that where the European "big man" treated islanders as men, there the alarums and excursions of major cult "outbreaks" were least in evidence.

This book makes a valuable addition to Pacific historiography—now awaited must be a new objective account of the European impact on the Pacific Islands as a whole, containing a comparative study of the varying island reactions, in which perhaps the cargo cults can be viewed in a fresh and appropriate perspective, together with European missionaries and marauders, officials, traders and sailors.

LES PYMEES; *CEDESA Brussels;* pp. 255; F.600

This bibliography of the Pygmy peoples is based on an MS prepared by Mrs. F. Pilsnier-Ladome. It contains nearly 1350 entries which cover virtually every facet of Pygmy life, making what must surely be a unique and most useful reference book for scholars and students. The information provided besides dealing with social, historical, ethnographical aspects, includes references to relevant maps, records, films, grammars, and dictionaries.

A HISTORY OF THE UPPER GUINEA COAST, 1545-1800 by WALTER RODNEY; *The Clarendon Press, Oxford;* maps, bibliography, index; pp. 283; £2.50

Dr. Rodney presents a scholarly history of the Guinea Coast—from the Gambia river down to Cape Mount. He provides a detailed, grim picture of the slave trade over a 250 year period when the transatlantic slave ships yearly plied their evil trade. Students of African history and Africana collectors will find much of interest and much that is new and recorded by the author as a result of hs original research.

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